EU sanctions against Russia explained

The EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia in response to the military aggression against Ukraine. Find out what this means in practice.

Since Russia’s recognition of the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine on 21 February 2022 and the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia. 

They add to existing measures imposed on Russia since 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Sanctions include targeted restrictive measures (individual sanctions), economic sanctions, and diplomatic measures.

The aim of the economic sanctions is to impose severe consequences on Russia for its actions and to thwart the Russian ability to continue the aggression effectively.

The individual sanctions target people responsible for supporting, financing, or implementing actions that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine or who benefit from these actions.

The EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus in response to its involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.

The sanctions do not block the export and transactions related to food and agricultural products.

EU leaders stressed at the European Council on 23-24 June 2022 that Russia is solely responsible for the global food crisis and that EU sanctions do not target food and agricultural products. Food security and affordability are key priorities for the EU and its member states.

EU sanctions do not impact food security and cover only bilateral trade between the EU and Russia – not international trade.​

EU sanctions explicitly exclude food supplies and fertilizers: there are no sanctions on Russian exports of food to global markets. Anyone can operate, buy, transport, and ensure food and fertilizers coming out of Russia.

The restrictions on the import of certain potash fertilizers under the EU sanctions only apply to products imported to the EU and do not concern exports of them to Ukraine from the EU or from Russia.

The EU has also made exceptions within its sanctions: although European airspace is not open to Russian aircraft, EU member states can authorize overflight of their airspace by Russian aircraft if that is required for humanitarian purposes. EU member states are also authorized to grant Russian-flagged vessels access to EU ports and Russian road carriers entry to the EU for importing or transporting agricultural products, including fertilizers and wheat, that are not subject to restrictions.

In total, also taking into account earlier individual sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU has sanctioned 108 entities and 1206 individuals. The list includes:

Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin

Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov

pro-Russian former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych

oligarchs linked to the Kremlin, such as Roman Abramovich

351 members of the Russian State Duma (the lower house of parliament) who voted in favor of the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk on 15 February 2022

members of the National Security Council

local politicians such as the mayor of Moscow 

high-ranking officials and military personnel

prominent businesspeople (i.e. people active in the Russian steel industry and others who provide financial services, military products, and technology to the Russian state)

propagandists and disinformation actors

individuals responsible for the atrocities committed in Bucha and Mariupol

individuals involved in the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine 

selected family members of some of the abovementioned individuals

Sanctions on individuals consist of travel bans and asset freezes. Travel bans prevent listed individuals from entering or transiting through EU territory, by either land, air, or sea.

Asset freezes mean that all accounts belonging to the listed persons and entities in EU banks are frozen. It is also prohibited to make any funds or assets directly or indirectly available to them.

This ensures that their money can no longer be used to support the Russian regime nor can they try to find a safe haven in the EU.

As part of the economic sanctions, the EU has imposed a number of import and export restrictions on Russia. This means that European entities cannot sell certain products to Russia (export restrictions) and that Russian entities are not allowed to sell certain products to the EU (import restrictions).

The list of banned products is designed to maximize the negative impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens. The export and import restrictions exclude products primarily intended for consumption and products related to health, pharma, food, and agriculture, in order not to harm the Russian population.

The bans are implemented by the EU’s customs authorities.

Moreover, the EU, in collaboration with other like-minded partners, has adopted a statement reserving the right to stop treating Russia as the most favored nation within the WTO framework. The EU has decided to act on this not through an increase in import tariffs, but through restrictive measures that include bans on the import or export of certain goods. The EU and its partners have also suspended any work related to the accession of Belarus to the WTO.

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

crude oil and refined petroleum products, with limited exceptions (with phase-out of 6 to 8 months)

coal and other solid fossil fuels (as there is a wind-down period for existing contracts, this sanction will apply as from August 2022)

gold, including jewelry

steel and iron

wood, cement, and certain fertilizers

seafood and liquor (e.g. caviar, vodka)

In June 2022, the Council adopted the sixth package of sanctions that, among others, prohibits the purchase, import, or transfer of crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU. The restrictions will apply gradually: within six months for crude oil and within eight months for other refined petroleum products.

A temporary exception is foreseen for imports of crude oil by pipeline into those EU member states that, due to their geographic situation, suffer from a specific dependence on Russian supplies and have no viable alternative options.

Moreover, Bulgaria and Croatia specifically will benefit from temporary derogations concerning the import of Russian seaborne crude oil and vacuum gas oil respectively.

As the majority of the Russian oil delivered to the EU is seaborne, these restrictions will cover nearly 90% of Russian oil imports to Europe by the end of the year. This will significantly reduce Russia’s trade profits.

The EU has prohibited Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering the EU, including for goods in transit.

This sanction aims to restrict the Russian industry’s capacity to acquire key goods and to disrupt road trade both to and from Russia. However, EU countries can grant derogations for:

the transport of energy

the transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid purposes

transport related to the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the EU and its countries in Russia, or of international organizations in Russia which enjoy immunities in accordance with international law

the transfer or export to Russia of cultural goods on loan in the context of formal cultural cooperation with Russia

The ban does not affect mail services and goods in transit between Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia.

In February 2022, the EU refused access to EU airports for Russian carriers of all kinds and banned them from overflying EU airspace. This means that airplanes registered in Russia or elsewhere and leased or rented to a Russian citizen or entity cannot land at any EU airports and cannot fly over EU countries. Private aircraft, e.g. private business jets, are included in the ban.

In addition, the EU banned the export to Russia of goods and technology in the aviation and space industry.

Insurance services, maintenance services, and technical assistance related to these goods and technology are also prohibited. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom imposed similar restrictions.

This means that Russian airlines cannot buy any aircraft, spare parts, or equipment for their fleet and cannot perform the necessary repairs or technical inspections. As three-quarters of Russia’s current commercial air fleet were produced in the EU, the US, or Canada, over time the ban is likely to result in the grounding of a significant proportion of the Russian civil aviation fleet, even for domestic flights.

The EU has closed its ports to Russia's entire merchant fleet of over 2 800 vessels. However, the measure does not affect vessels carrying:

energy

pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid

nuclear fuel and other goods necessary for the functioning of civil nuclear capabilities

coal (until 10 August 2022, after which imports of coal into the EU will be banned)

The measure also does not affect vessels in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, or vessels making an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety or saving life at sea.

The ban will also apply to vessels that try to evade the sanctions by changing their Russian flag or registration to that of another state. Port authorities can identify an attempt to reflag or change registration by checking a vessel’s IMO number (the unique identification number assigned on behalf of the International Maritime Organization).

The ban prevents ten Russian and four Belarusian banks from making or receiving international payments using SWIFT.

SWIFT is a messaging service that substantially facilitates information exchange between banks and other financial institutions. SWIFT connects more than 11 000 entities worldwide.

As a result, these banks can neither get foreign currency (as a transfer of foreign currencies between two banks is generally processed as a transfer abroad involving a foreign intermediary bank) nor transfer assets abroad. This has negative consequences for the Russian and Belarusian economies.

Technically, banks could carry out international transactions without SWIFT, but it is expensive, complex, and requires mutual trust between financial institutions. It brings payments back to the times when telephone and fax were used to confirm each transaction.

The European Union has prohibited all transactions with the National Central Bank of Russia related to the management of the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and assets. As a result of the central bank asset freeze, the central bank can no longer access the assets it has stored in central banks and private institutions in the EU.

In February 2022, Russia’s international reserves accounted for $643 billion (€579 billion). Among other purposes, having reserves in foreign currencies helps keep the exchange rate of a country’s own currency stable.

Due to the ban on transactions from the EU and other countries, it is estimated that more than half of Russian reserves are frozen. The ban was also imposed by other countries (such as the US, Canada, and the UK) which also store a share of Russia’s foreign reserves.

Consequently, Russia cannot use this cushion of foreign assets to provide funds to its banks and thus limit the effects of other sanctions. Even the gold reserves stored in Russia now appear to be more difficult to sell due to international sanctions affecting Russian entities.

The EU has also prohibited the sale, supply, transfer, and export of euro-denominated banknotes to Russia. The aim is to limit access to cash in euros by the Russian government, its Central Bank, and natural or legal persons in Russia with a view to preventing the circumvention of sanctions.

Similar sanctions apply to Belarus.

The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of disinformation, information manipulation, and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilizing both its neighboring countries and the EU and its member states.

To counteract this, the EU has suspended the broadcasting activities in the EU of five Russian state-owned outlets:

Sputnik

Russia Today

Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta

Rossiya 24/Russia 24

TV Centre International

Russia uses all these state-owned outlets to intentionally spread propaganda and conduct disinformation campaigns, including about its military aggression against Ukraine.

The restrictions against Sputnik and Russia Today (together with their subsidiaries, such as RT English, RT Germany, RT France, and RT Spanish) have been in place since 2 March 2022. The restrictions on the other three entities have been in place as of 4 June 2022.

They cover all means of transmission and distribution in or directed at the EU member states, including cable, satellite, Internet Protocol TV, platforms, websites, and apps.

In line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, these measures will not prevent those media outlets and their staff from carrying out activities in the EU other than broadcasting, e.g. research and interviews.

Sanctions are more effective if a broad range of international partners is involved. The EU has worked closely over the last few weeks with like-minded partners such as the United States in order to coordinate sanctions.

The EU is working with the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international partners to prevent Russia from obtaining financing from such institutions.

To coordinate this international effort, the newly formed Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force allow the EU to cooperate with the G7 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as well as with Australia, to ensure sanctions are implemented.

Although the EU works closely with many partners, each of these non-EU countries decides unilaterally which sanctions it will impose.

All EU sanctions are fully compliant with obligations under international law, whilst respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Once political agreement is reached among EU member states, the necessary legal acts are prepared by the European External Action Service and/or the European Commission and submitted to the Council for adoption.

Council regulations and decisions, as legal acts of general application, are binding on any person or entity under EU jurisdiction. This means any person or entity within the EU, any EU national in any location, and all companies and organizations incorporated under the law of an EU member state.

Global Gateway – the moment of truth.

 

The Global Gateway is the EU’s new connectivity strategy that aims to create smart, sustainable, and secure links with countries around the world in the thematic areas of digital, energy, and transport. It also aims to strengthen health and education systems across the world. The paper argues that the Global Gateway strategy has the seeds of something new, but that it will need to overcome a number of challenges to be successful.

The Global Gateway strategy presents a clear European offer based on democratic values, equal partnerships, environmental sustainability, safe and secure infrastructure, and integrates the private sector. The EU wants to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other regional and global players and to re-establish the EU’s standing, notably in Africa where the EU promised €150 billion of the €300 billion pledged under the Global Gateway investments.

It will be essential for member states to fully buy into the Global Gateway brand, bringing both their political and financial offer to the table. It will take time, patience, and genuine impact to develop the Global Gateway into a successful brand. Overcoming reputational issues, particularly in Africa, will require showing that this is genuinely a new approach. The Global Gateway will also require a change in the way development, foreign and economic policy areas work together, combining geopolitical steering and an understanding of private sector needs. Finally, there will be no Global Gateway unless the EU and its member states manage to scale up private sector investment.

The Global Gateway, the European Union’s 300 billion euro investment package, is committed to this, and its aim is to help restore the world order based on international and economic rules.

In the program that started almost a year ago, the approach that Estonia had set on its banner much earlier took shape: the idea of ​​trusted connectivity.

That Russia has waged war unjustifiably and has gravely violated international law has only made it all the more urgent that we adopt this approach.

We are replacing Russian fossil fuels with resilient supply chains that enable the transition to a green economy and avoid new dependencies. We want an open, secure, and human-centered digital society that reflects our democratic values ​​and norms. We are in constant contact with partners who want to build a free, prosperous, and sustainable future with us. On our way, we are now faced with a choice: are we willing to pay a premium for trust or not?

Europe’s message is clear: trust may have a price – but this price is worth paying. The value of freedom is priceless.

Actions followed words

The three Baltic states and other Central and Eastern European countries have been aware of Putin’s intentions for years and have warned others that Russia is not a reliable energy partner. Estonia – as well as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland – began to disconnect from Russian energy long before the Kremlin invaded Ukraine. The mentioned countries have invested in renewable energy, and have developed LNG terminals and energy system connectors. Thanks to the REPowerEU plan, the whole of Europe is now following their example to never again depend on Russian fossil fuels. The current crisis revealed what internal strength the European Union possesses. We acted together, quickly and decisively.

Our sanctions on Russia are crippling the country’s war economy, and Ukraine is making gains on the battlefield.

NATO and the Transatlantic Security Alliance are stronger than ever. However, the war is far from over. To ensure Ukraine’s victory, the EU and its allies must use their influence to shift the geopolitical and economic order in the direction of openness, cooperation, and freedom, to a situation where everyone abides by the rules that reflect these values. And for this, the Global Gateway initiative, which embodies the idea of ​​reliable connectivity, is the right tool.

Towards trusted partnerships

The Global Gateway is Europe’s promise to offer positive, value-based cooperation opportunities to our neighbors and global partners. While autocracies think in terms of spheres of influence and instead of eliminating them, they want to deepen unhealthy dependency relationships, we want to create partnerships based on common values ​​and a common vision for the future. We want to build the digital and environmentally friendly infrastructure of the future economy, we want to connect our partners – including our eastern neighbors – with Europe, and Europe with the colorful and dynamic southern part of the world.

Global Gateway is already delivering tangible results.

For example, the EU finances new economic corridors and energy industry infrastructure with its help, so that the countries of the Western Balkans are more closely connected to the Union and come closer to realizing their dreams of European integration. By investing in renewable energy, green hydrogen, and raw materials value chains, we are building mutually beneficial relationships with countries such as Namibia and Chile. This benefits both their sustainable growth and our energy security. A good example is the creation of digital infrastructures, such as the new undersea optical cable under the Black Sea, with which we diversify Internet access in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Through the Global Gateway, we are also supporting the establishment of plants producing mRNA vaccines in Rwanda, Senegal, and soon in Latin America, to advance global health by transferring advanced technologies and improving regional resilience.

It is important to act unitedly against the increasing confidence and aggression of autocratic regimes. That is why the Global Gateway connects Europe’s closest partners, as well as other initiatives promoting reliable connectivity, such as the global infrastructure and investment partnership of the G7. In this way, we can not only strengthen the impact of our investments but also use our knowledge and standardization power more effectively. Together, we are able to shape the new era of globalization, an era in which the resilience of the economy is important, not just economic efficiency, and which, in addition to serving our well-being, is also in line with our values.

Collaboration platform

We have reached a decisive moment – the moment of truth.

We must continue to meet the challenges and build a strong coalition for progress against historical revisionism. To facilitate cooperation, Estonia created the “Team Europe” partnership portal, where the European Union and its member states can contact their partners within the framework of the Global Gateway initiative. This year’s Tallinn Digital Summit is also a call to democratic countries to put into practice the vision of reliable connectivity together, to protect freedom and democracy, and to demonstrate our long-term commitment – to Ukraine, to peace, to open and fair international in addition to the future of our order.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia.

Eighth package of sanctions

This package introduces new EU import bans worth €7 billion to curb Russia's revenues, as well as export restrictions, which will further deprive the Kremlin's military and industrial complex of key components and technologies and Russia's economy of European services and expertise. The sanctions also deprive the Russian army and its suppliers from further specific goods and equipment needed to wage its war on Ukrainian territory. The package also lays the basis for the required legal framework to implement the oil price cap envisaged by the G7.

6 October 2022Brussels

The Commission welcomes the Council's adoption of an eighth package of hard-hitting sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. This package – which has been closely coordinated with our international partners – responds to Russia's continued escalation and illegal war against Ukraine, including by illegally annexing Ukrainian territory based on sham “referenda”, mobilising additional troops, and issuing open nuclear threats.

Specifically, this package contains the following elements:

Additional listings

Additional individuals and entities have been sanctioned. This targets those involved in Russia's occupation, illegal annexation, and sham “referenda” in the occupied territories/oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. It also includes individuals and entities working in the defence sector, such as high-ranking and military officials, as well as companies supporting the Russian armed forces. The EU also continues to target actors who spread disinformation about the war. 

EU restrictive measure target key decision makers, oligarchs, senior military officials and propagandists, responsible for undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Extension of restrictions to the oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia

The geographical scope of the restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas has been extended to cover all the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

New export restrictions

Additional export restrictions have been introduced which aim to reduce Russia's access to military, industrial and technological items, as well as its ability to develop its defence and security sector.

This includes the banning of the export of coal including coking coal (which is used in Russian industrial plants), specific electronic components (found in Russian weapons), technical items used in the aviation sector, as well as certain chemicals.

A prohibition on exporting small arms and other goods under the anti-torture Regulation has been added.

New import restrictions

Almost €7 billion worth of additional import restrictions have been agreed.

It includes, for example, a ban on the import of Russian finished and semi-finished steel products (subject to a transition period for some semi-finished), machinery and appliances, plastics, vehicles, textiles, footwear, leather, ceramics, certain chemical products, and non-gold jewellery.

Implementing the G7 oil price cap

Today's package marks the beginning of the implementation within the EU of the G7 agreement on Russian oil exports. While the EU's ban on importing Russian seaborne crude oil fully remains, the price cap, once implemented, would allow European operators to undertake and support the transport of Russian oil to third countries, provided its price remains under a pre-set “cap”. This will help to further reduce Russia's revenues, while keeping global energy markets stable through continued supplies. It will thus also help address inflation and keep energy costs stable at a time when high costs – particularly elevated fuel prices – are a great concern to all Europeans.

This measure is being closely coordinated with G7 partners. It would take effect after 5 December 2022 for crude and 5 February 2023 for refined petroleum products, after a further decision by the Council.

Restrictions on State-owned enterprises

Today's package bans EU nationals from holding posts in the governing bodies of certain state-owned enterprises.

It also bans all transactions with the Russian Maritime Register, adding it to the list of state-owned enterprises which are subject to a transaction ban.  

Financial, IT consultancy and other business services

The existing prohibitions on crypto assets have been tightened by banning all crypto-asset wallets, accounts, or custody services, irrespective of the amount of the wallet (previously up to €10,000 was allowed).

The package widens the scope of services that can no longer be provided to the government of Russia or legal persons established in Russia: these now include IT consultancy, legal advisory, architecture and engineering services. These are significant as they will potentially weaken Russia's industrial capacity because it is highly dependent on importing these services.

Deterring sanctions circumvention

The EU has introduced a new listing criterion, which will allow it to sanction persons who facilitate the infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of sanctions.

More Information

The EU's sanctions against Russia are proving effective. They are damaging Russia's ability to manufacture new weapons and repair existing ones, as well as hinder its transport of material.

The geopolitical, economic, and financial implications of Russia's continued aggression are clear, as the war has disrupted global commodities markets, especially for agrifood products and energy. The EU continues to ensure that its sanctions do not impact energy and agrifood exports from Russia to third countries.

As guardian of the EU Treaties, the European Commission monitors the enforcement of EU sanctions across the EU.

The EU stands united in its solidarity with Ukraine, and will continue to support Ukraine and its people together with its international partners, including through additional political, financial, and humanitarian support.

For More Information

European Commission website on EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus

European Commission website on Ukraine

Q&A on restrictive measures (which will be availble shortly)

Ps. 

Ekonomske sankcije su komercijalne i financijske kazne koje jedna ili više zemalja primjenjuje protiv ciljane samoupravne države, skupine ili pojedinca. Ekonomske sankcije nisu nužno nametnute zbog ekonomskih okolnosti – mogu se nametnuti i za niz političkih, vojnih i društvenih pitanja.

Europe - the first climate-neutral continent

How Europe will approach infrastructure needs, and keep up with technological developments, will determine the bloc’s resilience to extreme temperatures, droughts, and floods which are becoming more frequent with climate change. Many technologies are already available, such as advanced water management systems, smart mobility solutions, and digital twins. The question is how fast Europe will be able to roll out infrastructure that is critical for the twin digital and green transitions.

Promoting and adopting cutting-edge technologies in infrastructure is crucial to overcome the EU’s current energy crisis and achieving the bloc’s green and digital goals. Infrastructure is like the ground we stand on: we only notice it when it gives in beneath our feet.

In the EU, infrastructure has become a top political priority in recent months. From the current energy crisis and the ramifications of Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, to record temperatures making railways inoperable, and flash floods prompting calls for a coordinated EU water policy, the importance of future-proofing our infrastructure has crystalized before our eyes.

As President Von der Leyen deliver her third State of the Union address, there is a realization that the vision laid out in the Green Deal of making Europe the first climate-neutral continent—and which critically depends on the ability to execute on infrastructure—has proved challenging.

In particular, the important link between the “green” and “digital” prongs of the twin transitions is often underestimated and misunderstood.

EU member states face different challenges when it comes to going digital in infrastructure. A quick review of the 27 National Recovery and Resilience Plans reveals that the word “digitization” is used to describe many different types of projects, from the conversion of public administration filing systems into electronic formats, to ambitious plans to modernize transport and water management infrastructure.

In no other field is this dichotomy between “green” and “digital” more relevant than in relation to the REPower EU Plan, published by the European Commission in May. Announced as a comprehensive set of measures to eliminate the EU’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the EU’s transition toward renewable energy, it is a once-in-a-generation plan in its ambition and scope.

At the same time, however, the Commission exempted member states from the 20% minimum spend requirement on digital for the new, energy-focused chapter, which they will now add to their respective national plans.

While the current crisis explains why the Commission sought to lower implementation requirements on member states, and EU officials have been at pains to publicly encourage national efforts on digital, there is a real risk that the need to move fast will result in a missed opportunity to modernize European energy infrastructure.

Take infrastructure digital twins for a sustainable grid, for instance—a realistic, dynamic digital representation of a physical asset, process, or system that connects the physical infrastructure asset and virtual world while synchronizing work to make sense of the right data at the right time across the entire lifecycle of the asset. By enabling seamless collaboration between different engineering disciplines and exponentially better visibility on outcomes through the power of AI and machine learning, digital twins lead to better decisions—whether these relate to an electrical grid, a hydroelectric dam, or a gas pipeline in need of retrofitting.

Going one step further, if such infrastructure digital twins are based on openness, interoperability, and robust cybersecurity principles, policymakers can manage energy infrastructure from a holistic perspective to achieve key EU objectives, such as energy security, resilience, and diversification. Digital technologies will enable the implementation of an “energy efficiency first” principle across all sectors of the economy.

This “ecosystem” approach to energy is key to the EU’s future. It is the difference between looking at static assets in isolation, removed from their context and surroundings, and looking at energy needs and outcomes collectively. It is through digital that the EU will move beyond discussing the energy needs of individual member states and execute on policies where the entire EU acts swiftly as one.

It is, therefore, vital that both the execution of REPower EU by member states and other EU initiatives, such as the Action Plan on the Digitalization of the Energy Sector, promote the adoption of cutting-edge technologies such as digital twins. Infrastructure technology has advanced since the days of CAD [CAD: Computer Aided Design] and BIM [BIM: Building Information Modelling] — and it is important that EU policy advances along with it.

The EU is a worldwide leader when it comes to ambition and long-term vision on infrastructure. And it is in infrastructure—the often-invisible things that make our society and economy run—that the biggest and most immediate welfare benefits from digital will be felt.

Now is the time to accelerate toward next-generation EU infrastructure. Going digital will help propel the EU out of this crisis in its truest form: open, resilient and, above all, united.

Deposit refund schemes (DRS)

Most people feel helpless. As if they have no control over their life. In truth, you have more control over that world than you think. It has been said that luck is what happens when opportunity meets preparedness. 

Imagine two men walking down the street on a windy day. A piece of paper blows along the sidewalk in front of one man, then the other. The first man ignores the litter, keeping his eyes on the block up ahead. The second man peers at the scrap realize it’s a $20 bill and picks it up. Is that person luckier?

No. The same opportunity crossed the path of both men, but only one of them was prepared to act. I'm not saying that you should dig through the trash and look at the floor, but... 

This is how people in Croatia improve their budget and help recycle at the same time.

The Deposit Refund System in Croatia started with its implementation in 2006 and the decision was driven by increasing quantities of packaging waste since the 1990s as a result of the rising use of non-refillable beverage packaging: PET, bottles, and cans. The system foresees that a deposit is established for one-way beverage containers of greater volume than 0.2l made of plastic (PET), metal (aluminum and iron), and glass containing alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, water, fruit juices, and soft drinks. Milk and milk-containing beverages are subject to an exception and are excluded from the system. A returnable fee of 0.50 HRK (0,06€) is to be applied per packaging unit regardless of the material and size. The take-back process is established in each retail store (automatically by reverse vending machines or manually) where beverages packaged in aluminum, iron, PET, or glass are sold to end consumers with the exception of small retailers (which have less than 200m2).

Learning by example

A container deposit scheme in South Australia which applies an AUD 0.10 refundable deposit to beverage containers has led to a three-fold reduction in the number of beverage containers becoming litter on beaches.

In 2001, Israel introduced a deposit refund law that applies a deposit of ILS 0.25 to glass and plastic containers smaller than 1.5 liters. A cost-benefit analysis in 2010 concluded that the law had had a positive impact, with total benefits exceeding total costs by around 35%, and potentially greater benefits if the scheme were also applied to larger bottles.

In Ecuador, a refundable USD 0.02 deposit paid per PET beverage bottle (in 2011) led to a significant increase in PET bottle recycling, increasing from 30% in 2011 to 80% in 2012, when 1.13 million of the 1.4 million PET bottles produced were recycled.

The USA has no federal legislation on bottle refund schemes, but several States have introduced ‘bottle bills’. The California Redemption Value (CRV) is USD 0.05 for containers smaller than 0.7 liters and USD 0.10 for larger containers. Since its introduction in 1987, it is estimated that 300 billion aluminum, glass, and plastic beverage containers have been recycled.

In the US, the weight of a can fluctuates with various brand designs, but they tend to be around a half-ounce per can. At an average of 59 cents per pound, that makes a single can worth about 1.8 cents. At that rate, you could make $20 for about 1,000 cans (or 84 12-packs of 12-ounce cans). 

Measuring success – and looking for ways to improve

Zeljko Serdar, CEO, and founder of CCRES comments: “By working on the DRS system, we utilize our know-how in the field of digital transformation of waste management. It is very motivating for us to participate in a project with such a positive impact on recycling. When it comes to financial matters, it’s important to keep your eyes and ears open and to know where you are. Only then will you spot the opportunity when it crosses your path. Sometimes we all just need a little help opening our eyes."

India power demand

India’s transition away from coal

This post-industrial revolution demand for fossil fuels has strained our planet’s ecological health. The damage caused by burning the vast quantities of carbon-based fuels needed to run our development engines and modern economies is well known now. We are looking at increasing atmospheric temperatures, melting glaciers, rising sea levels, changing rainfall patterns, failing agriculture, drought, floods, and rampaging rivers. Not to mention the health detriments, deteriorating quality of life, and economic costs of pollution from fossil fuels. Also, fossil fuels are in increasingly short supply.

Energy is the crucial currency of the modern era. An indubitable requirement of a growing economy like India, energy is the lifeblood of manufacturing, transport, construction, communication, and mobility. Wars have been fought, countries subjugated, governments overthrown and established to literally fuel global demands for energy.

Compounding the problem is that in many nations including India, energy sources like coal and minerals such as iron, manganese, and aluminum lie under some of the last wilderness areas. Areas that are vital watersheds, carbon sinks, and home to many endangered plants and animals. So, how we decide to plan our resource needs and extract energy from finite sources will be crucial determinants of India’s social, economic, and environmental sustainability.

India is ramping up its efforts to decarbonize its economy with its commitment to turn Net Zero by 2070 and updated nationally determined contributions (NDC) of getting 50 percent installed energy capacity from non-fossil fuels by 2030. Moving away from fossil fuels; promoting green power and green hydrogen; environmental, social, and governance targets; electrifying transport; and boosting energy efficiency are all initiatives the government is taking to meet its goals. Still, Modi in his speech heralded the growing economic links between India and Russia. 

Piling Into India’s Renewable Industry

The country needs to add renewable energy capacity across all the resources to meet the expectations created through these interventions. India's green energy transition story hinges on the wind. India aims to install 140 gigawatts of wind power capacity over the next decade, of which approximately 100 GW have not yet been established. Wind energy contributes to a resilient system by playing both a complementary and a grid-balancing role since it is available during peak hours and after daylight hours when solar energy is unavailable.

The rising demand for power associated with the simultaneous growth of urban centers and modernizing rural areas is burdening our coal-based energy sector. While current power plants are creaking under the strain, alternative sources like hydropower or wind seem to have limited scope for large-scale power generation in a country where land is tightly contested. Some "renewable" energy modes also come with attendant environmental and social costs if poorly planned, as has already been witnessed with windmills and small-hydel plants in the Western Ghats. Further, inefficient transmission systems cause massive losses of scarce power.

EU-India cooperation on renewable energy

Part of the answer perhaps lies in decentralized, small-scale energy grids. In decentralized models, urban, semi-urban, and rural centers can be designed to have their own grids based on a variety of local power sources. Shorter powerlines can help cut transmission losses. Simultaneously, buildings can be made more energy efficient by changing energy consumption through efficient usage, and integrating solar power generation into building architecture can make rural and urban homes self-sufficient. EU Commissioner for Energy, Kadri Simson, is in New Delhi, India, to strengthen the EU's cooperation with the country in the field of renewable energy. The Commissioner participate in an event on EU-India cooperation in the area of solar energy with India's Minister of State for New and Renewable Energy and Chemical and Fertilizer, Bhagwat Khutba. She will also hold bilateral meetings with the Minister of Coal, Mines, and Parliamentary Affairs, Pralhad Joshi; and the Director General of International Solar Alliance, Ajay Mathur. 

The Commissioner chair the EU-India Green Hydrogen Forum, where she will deliver a keynote address, with the Minister of Power and New and Renewable Energy, Raj Kumar Singh. Norway announced heavy solar investment in India, highlighting the country as a priority market for its renewable energy growth. Funding comes from Norway’s Climate Investment Fund (CIF) and its biggest pension company, KLP, with plans to develop a 420MW solar energy project in Rajasthan. The companies are expected to spend $35 million on the development, with a 49 percent stake in the Thar Surya 1 project, alongside Italian firm Enel Green Power. But the investment doesn’t stop here, with the Norwegian Embassy earmarking $1 billion in CIF finance for renewable energy projects in India over the next half a decade, calling it a “priority market”.

And Norway is not the first investor to see India as a key market for renewable energy development. Foreign investors have been partnering with local energy producers to fund the development of India’s solar power sector, already attracting funding from Singapore and Abu Dhabi, banks such as Goldman Sachs, funds like Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners (CIP), and utilities such as Japan's JERA. JP Morgan, Standard Chartered, and other banks are also offering green bonds for renewable energy projects.

To further cut fossil fuel use, smarter cities should be built to have work-residential complexes that reduce daily travel. Improving public transport will encourage a majority of city dwellers to use this travel option, helping decongest roads and decrease pollution. Importantly, developing such cutting-edge infrastructure across the country can provide vast opportunities for governments and businesses to tap into the emerging ‘green economy’ sector.

India considers new coal imports

However, the current infrastructure is locked into centralized power generation and distribution of fossil-fuel energy. Decentralized models are not in our national psyche. For a vast majority of the rural populace, the idea of ‘development’ is inextricably linked to a connection with the few big power grids. Outreach and education are going to be a crucial component of changing energy models. In the meantime, our old systems of coal and petroleum extraction and use will have to be systematically overhauled to allow for newer distribution models. Much research and discussion are needed to find alternative sources of large-scale power generation that are safe, reliable, and long-term. Of course, any of this can only work with honest, efficient, inclusive, and transparent governance that can adaptively respond to knowledge and information.

Against the backdrop of these demands, ecologists and conservation biologists are tasked with the job of emphasizing the need to keep aside land for wildlife. Not being land-use specialists, we cannot answer many of the planning conundrums we pose, which sometimes earns us bad rap as anti-development Luddites. So, let me try clearing the slate. While saving wilderness and wild species is usually our primary motivation for thinking and talking about more significant questions of sustainability, ecologists and conservationists are only one amongst a more expansive cast of actors that can make this happen. For a country’s development to become sustainable, teams of well-trained experts need to collaborate and reach consensual solutions to best tackle diverse issues. Engineers, land-use planners, developmental economists, social scientists, architects, and agriculture scientists have to gather at the table, recognize the ripple impacts of decisions taken within their narrow domains and try to find cross-disciplinary solutions to the knotty issues of sustainability.

India is seeking to avoid any repeat of the coal crunch

“We are watching the situation anxiously,” CCRES, Zeljko Serdar said in an interview. "Energy officials in India are considering whether further coal imports may be needed to avoid any fresh squeeze on the nation’s power supply. Coal helps produce about 70% of India’s electricity. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi said that he is keen to boost ties with Russia, even as the country has become an international pariah following its invasion of Ukraine. Modi spoke of a “special partnership” between the two countries and expressed particular interest in bolstering their cooperation on energy and coking coal. Collective knowledge can help plan a sustainable future for India, but to meet the ambitious sustainability targets, we have to institute appropriate regulatory frameworks for energy use and respect the instruments and mechanisms needed to enforce them. FDI in solar and wind energy, green hydrogen, renewable battery manufacturing, and several other innovative green energy projects could help to produce the clean power required for India to transition away from fossil fuels, as well as export its energy to other countries worldwide in support of a global green transition. The systems we create today will determine whether India will use natural resources judiciously and provide future generations with a cleaner, healthier, and more productive environment".

Secondary Sanctions

 

From now Secondary Sanctions?

Outside of the United States, all economic sanctions imposed by a country are primary sanctions. In contrast, secondary sanctions impose penalties on persons and organizations not subject to the sanctioning country’s legal jurisdiction and are applied against entities engaged in the same dealings prohibited under primary sanctions. 

Penalties for violating a secondary sanction

A party violating the prohibitions or restrictions subject to secondary sanctions is the one subject to the regulatory consequences. However, the penalties are significantly more severe; generally, they consist of restrictions or prohibitions from accessing the imposing country’s financial system and/or the broader economy. 

While there is a range of penalties that can be imposed under various U.S. sanctions regulations, the most severe is the loss of access to the financial system in the U.S. (and by U.S. financial institutions, located wherever). 

This measure effectively bars the sanctioned party from doing business with customers and suppliers in the U.S., since it prevents access to the currency. It also makes being a significant force in international trade considerably more difficult, as the U.S. dollar is not only involved in over 60 percent of foreign exchange deals (which is how the buyer’s currency is used to purchase the goods and services in the seller’s currency) but is also the primary currency in which important commodities such as oil and precious metals are typically bought and sold.

Sanctioning has been dominating world news since the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in February 2022. Harsh sanctions were imposed almost immediately after the invasion. The EU imposed sanctions on several oligarchs and politicians, and the Central Bank of Russia was blocked from accessing foreign-exchange reserves held abroad. 

Sanctions are important political tools that governments use to achieve their foreign policy goals or as a means to punish and discourage violations of international law. Sanctions usually involve the application of economic restrictions against foreign targets (e.g. nations, government regimes, organizations, persons). However, sanctions are not always applied to persons that fall within the jurisdiction of the sanctioning government but also to persons in foreign jurisdictions who trade with targets who have been sanctioned. 

This dual approach to the enforcement of sanctions is often referred to as primary and secondary sanctions. Different categories of sanctions may apply to different situations, and it’s important for financial entities and obliged businesses to understand what they need to do in order to achieve compliance. 

Primary sanctions generally apply to US persons or to situations where there is a US nexus (such as the involvement of a US person, US-originating goods or transactions that take place within US borders). Secondary sanctions authorize OFAC or the US State Department to threaten sanctions on a person – even a non-US citizen – for a specified activity. Sanctions are intended to discourage non-US persons from engaging in specific transactions, even if these transactions are not subject to primary sanctions. 

Sanctions are a strict liability regime, and the act of violation carries civil liability. Persons or entities who willfully violate sanctions may face criminal liability as well as make attempts or conspiracies to violate sanctions. Penalties may include severe monetary fines or imprisonment.

What Are Primary Sanctions? 

Primary sanctions are economic restrictions. These restrictions require compliance from all persons and entities within the issuing country. In the United States, the Office of Foreign Assets (OFAC) imposes a range of sanctions, including full trade embargoes, asset freezes or seizures, and travel bans against foreign targets. 

OFAC primary sanctions may be imposed against countries, businesses, or individuals deemed guilty of committing international crimes or working against national security interests. 

Some of the current sanction targets by the US include North Korea, Cuba, Syria, Russia, and certain Chinese interests. 

Who Needs to Comply With Primary Sanctions?

OFAC requires US citizens, permanent residents (located anywhere in the world), persons of any nationality located within the US, entities organized in the USA or incorporated in the US (including their foreign branches), and all transactions processed via the US financial system or in US dollars to comply with primary sanctions. Failure to comply may lead to fines of up to $1 million per violation or up to 50% of the value of the transaction. 

What Are Secondary Sanctions?

Secondary sanctions are designed to prevent third parties from trading with countries subject to sanctions issued by another country – even if these third parties are not citizens of the issuing country or based in the issuing country. They may face penalties for doing business with the targeted country or individuals. 

The primary difference between primary and secondary sanctions is that secondary sanctions are enforced by targeting domestic entities rather than the third party. In another example, when the US reinstated its sanctions against Iran, they reinstated secondary sanctions for non-US persons trading with Iran for sectors, including the energy, precious metal, software, food, or financial services industries. Thousands of Iranians were added to the SDN list.

Unlike primary sanctions that are enforced by fines or seizure of US-held assets, secondary sanctions rely heavily on the importance of the US financial system and the use of the US dollar as a favored global reserve currency. 

Secondary sanctions can enhance the effects of primary sanctions and protect the security interests of the issuing countries. For example, FinCEN (the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network) prohibited US financial institutions from opening or maintaining any correspondent accounts for or on behalf of the Chinese Bank of Dandong. 

This bank was found to be in violation of the US Patriot Act by laundering money for a Chinese trade conglomerate, Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development (DHID). This conglomerate has been found to run money laundering schemes for the benefit of the North Korean government. While targeted sanctions have already been imposed against North Korea for some time, this particular sanction hit the DHID hard as they are responsible for a large share of Sino-North Korean trade, which in turn deterred Chinese banks and financial firms located in other nations from transacting with North Korean businesses.  

Who Needs to Comply With Secondary Sanctions?

Non-US entities with business relationships in the US must comply with secondary issues. If they are in violation, they may be restricted partially or totally from participating in the US financial system, including import or export restrictions. US persons who are found in violation of sanctions may find themselves on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) list. 

Why Are Secondary Sanctions Being Discussed in 2022? 

The vast majority of US secondary sanctions apply to Iran and North Korea. The sanctions have made it difficult for Iran to sell their oil globally and have been designed to make it difficult for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. 

Secondary sanctions are in the news at present due to heavy sanctions imposed against Russia by the US, UK, and EU. While current sanctions caused inflation to spike in Russia and caused the collapse of many of its major banks, Russia’s ability to sell oil and gas to the rest of Europe has reduced the impact of trade sanctions, albeit slightly, as it helped the ruble recover some of its value. Ukraine is currently asking the US and its allies to consider secondary sanctions against Russia. 

Secondary sanctions are sometimes controversial as they are sometimes considered an extraterritorial application of US laws, and some opponents of secondary sanctions say the US uses these regimes as a means of influencing the decision-making processes of countries that would not otherwise be in violation of US sanctions. There is also a risk that secondary sanctions may damage alliances across the globe, e.g. if the UK continues to buy oil and gas from Russia, the US may not take kindly to it.

Secondary sanctions are often misunderstood and can lead to over-compliance or confusion, which in turn could slow down global business. 

Multinational or cross-border firms must remain compliant with primary and secondary sanctions and screen customers against all relevant sanctions lists. UK firms that conduct business with clients in both the US and Russia must carefully screen using the UK Sanctions List and OFAC Sanctions List. 

When assessing sanctions-based risk, businesses and other obliged entities or persons must consider the following:

• Any entities or individuals which are SDN-listed, including entities that are majority-owned by listed entities or designated individuals;
• Whether or not there is a US connection to the proposed transaction or activity, including transacting in US dollars or through the US financial system; 
• The scope of the sanctions regime, including whether sanctions all transactions/activities with SDN-listed businesses and individuals or just targeted sector-related transactions and activities; 
• Whether or not sanctions are primary or secondary. 

Conclusion 

Whether you are dealing with either primary or secondary sanctions, it’s important to adopt accurate and rapid screening solutions that can capture and check customers’ data as they are being onboarded. The ideal solution produces very few false positives and reduces the administrative burden placed on already stretched compliance officers. 

These solutions should also have the ability to handle aliases, non-Western naming conventions, and the use of a non-Latin alphabet. If you would like to know about sanctions.io and sanctions screening, do not hesitate to get in touch.

*For the rest of the year, G7 partners will attempt to find workable solutions to the conundrum of keeping oil and gas flowing out of Russia while reducing revenue inflows.

*The likelihood of imposing secondary sanctions against Chinese firms selling into Russia is now higher but China is taking a careful approach in order to avoid these.

Western sanctions have succeeded in causing Russia to default on its sovereign debt and isolated Russia from the global economy, but the cost has been high. Uncertainty oversupply has sent energy prices flying. Figuring out how to minimize the blowback on Western economies will be a priority for G7 partners. We will see whether the US Treasury, which is actively promoting the price cap idea, will succeed in getting the EU on board to enforce it. In the meantime, China is likely to do enough to avoid US secondary sanctions, even if that requires moving away from transactions with Russia and reducing the volume of its exports. 

Energy security

 

 Image: CCRES

Rising concerns over energy security and climate change will galvanize record new capacity to generate renewable power in 2022, the International Energy Agency (IEA). The IEA forecasts that 320 gigawatts will come online this year, equivalent to top European economy Germany's total annual demand, up from a previous record of 295 gigawatts in 2021.

Nothing, it seems, can hold back the advance of renewable energy. Despite post-pandemic delays and rising raw material costs, a record amount of renewable capacity was installed in 2021.

Now the International Energy Agency (IEA) expects that record to be beaten again in 2022, at least in part as nations that have relied on fossil fuels from Russia, push ahead with new renewable capacity in response to the war in Ukraine.

Renewable energy growth means the world now has 295 gigawatts of green generating capacity, says the IEA, demonstrating what the World Economic Forum’s Fostering Effective Energy Transition 2021 report described as its “unprecedented acceleration” in recent years.

As the transition to clean energy gathers pace, it can be challenging to see the full picture. These four charts reveal the state of renewable energy around the world today.

Net renewable capacity additions by technology, 2017-2023. Image: IEA

The IEA says 2021’s 6% growth will be followed by an 8% rise in installed capacity in 2022, led by a surge in solar power. However, progress has been uneven, with a 17% decline in new wind installations in 2021 offset by the rise in solar and hydropower.

In India, the rate of growth in renewable energy doubled in 2021 after a record slowdown in 2020 caused by the impact of COVID-19 on projects. Brazil’s incentives led to a growth in rooftop solar and onshore wind also accelerated, the IEA said.

The power of government initiatives to help or harm renewable roll-outs was demonstrated in Viet Nam, where the ending of a feed-in tariff for rooftop solar saw a dramatic slowdown; while in South Africa, the completion of pre-approved wind and solar led to resumed growth.

Solar PV and onshore wind investment cost estimates for new projects under high commodity prices 2015-2023. Image: IEA

Even if current high energy prices are maintained, the IEA says solar will retain and even increase its cost advantage over the next two years. This is despite the rising cost of raw materials used to construct renewable energy installations.

In the past 12 months, the cost of polysilicon used in solar panels has more than quadrupled, says the IEA, while the price of steel rose by 50% and copper by 70%. Overall, raw material costs for all types of renewable energy were 15% to 25% higher, the IEA says.

Renewable net capacity additions by country and region 2019-2021. Image: IEA

China accounted for 46% of the new generating capacity added in 2021, with subsidies encouraging record-breaking rises in the amount of offshore wind which increased sixfold. In Europe, solar accounted for most of the growth, with projects in Spain, France, Poland, and Germany.

The IEA expects Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to lead to increases in renewable energy capacity, particularly in Europe. Russia, which supplies around 45% of the European Union’s gas, has already cut supplies to Bulgaria, Finland, and Poland.

Incremental growth in renewable capacity in Europe by 2023 could almost entirely replace electricity generation, which is currently powered by Russian gas, says the IEA. Even on current trends renewables could reduce dependence on Russian gas “significantly”, it says.

Renewable net capacity additions 2019-2021. Image: IEA

Solar is expected to account for 60% of the increase in global renewable capacity in 2022, taking the global total to more than 300 gigawatts. Two-thirds will be large-scale projects encouraged by policies in China and the European Union, says the IEA.

New onshore wind capacity is also expected to recover after slipping back in 2021, but the global rate at which new offshore wind installations are built will slow significantly, reflecting the end of subsidies in China which drove a record capacity surge in 2021.

Even so, China’s total installed offshore wind capacity globally is expected to surpass the European Union and the United Kingdom combined by the end of 2022.

As the largest player in renewables, events in China affect global totals. The IEA says additions to the world’s hydropower capacity will be 40% lower in 2022 as the number of new projects in China falls.

 Image: CCRES

The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have driven inflation to multi-decade highs and led to soaring energy prices in some advanced economies, leaving policymakers scrambling to find cheaper and reliable energy. Energy market developments in recent months – especially in Europe – have proven once again the essential role of renewables in improving energy security, in addition to their well-established effectiveness at reducing emissions. But the growth of renewable power has been hampered by supply chain difficulties, and the cost of installing solar photovoltaic (PV) panels will remain high this year and next due to higher commodity and freight prices, CCRES president Zeljko Serdar said.

Maximize the use of RES with a cogeneration system and PV agrivoltaics

Since 2016 CCRES has been operating an innovation technology park that incorporates a training and research center.

One of the main changes that CCRES has made is to install a management system where you can study the consumption and assess what part of the process can be improved.

This will help to evaluate its weaknesses and aid us in what way the RES will influence this process.

The project objectives are:

• Reduce the power required (measuring the collection hours, and functionality periods….)

• Maximise the use of RES with a cogeneration system and PV agrivoltaics.

This management system can reduce energy consumption by 30-40%.

At the very least, showcases the ability of agrivoltaics to increase land-use efficiency without sacrificing much in the way of either energy or food production. Furthermore, many agrivoltaic configurations appear even to enhance both food and energy production while at the same time reducing the environmental impact of pursuing each activity as a standalone.

While this area of research is still advancing, findings from these particular studies can help to inform optimal designs and standards for emerging applications of agrivoltaics. To date, little support and guidance on best-practice implementation, let alone policy, exists to foster agrivoltaic deployment. Yet if current signals in research hold up, agrivoltaics may help low-carbon energy to become synergistic with, rather than competitive with, other sustainable development goals. 

Zeljko Serdar, CCRES