BRICS currency

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin unveils BRICS prototype currency. Putin was seen holding a mock-up of the “BRICS bill,” featuring the flags of the five member nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – interconnected in a circle.

One of the primary issues with the “BRICS Bill” lies in its inconsistent representation of member nations. For instance, the bill features Pashto text referring to the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan” (the Taliban regime), yet it bears the flag of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Since the Taliban regime is not internationally recognised and has limited diplomatic acceptance, this inconsistency highlights the challenges of unifying such diverse nations under a single currency framework. Additionally, many BRICS members, including India and South Africa, are reluctant to formally engage with unrecognised governments, further complicating the bill’s acceptance.

Using the “BRICS Bill” for economic exchanges would introduce significant limitations for member states, many of which are not the most economically powerful. Forcing reliance on a shared currency would hinder BRICS countries’ ability to freely trade with non-member states. This limitation is exacerbated by the bloc’s ongoing efforts to reduce dependency on the US dollar while simultaneously maintaining global trade relations. According to the Johannesburg Declaration, BRICS nations are exploring mechanisms to increase trade in local currencies, but the creation of a shared currency remains a distant goal.

A major concern among BRICS nations is the potential destabilisation of national currencies. If a shared “BRICS Bill” were to be introduced, it could lead to inflation and depreciation of national currencies, especially for smaller economies like South Africa or Brazil. A potential decline in the value of national currencies would negatively impact economic stability, making the adoption of a shared currency an unattractive option.

Despite the challenges surrounding the “BRICS Bill,” discussions about creating a digital BRICS currency are gaining momentum. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been a vocal advocate for a digital currency to facilitate trade among BRICS nations without replacing national currencies. However, even this idea faces significant hurdles, including the logistical complexities of implementing a digital currency across a diverse bloc of nations. It remains to be seen whether a digital BRICS currency will materialise, but discussions on the topic are still in the early stages.

Adopting a shared “BRICS Bill” could lead to negative consequences from Western countries, including the imposition of sanctions and higher tariffs. BRICS’ growing influence is already viewed as a challenge to Western financial dominance, particularly in light of the bloc’s ongoing expansion. Introducing a shared currency could escalate tensions and lead to economic retaliation from key global players like the US and the European Union. Such risks have led BRICS leaders to exercise caution when considering a shared financial instrument.

The BRICS Bill is more symbolic than practical, and adopting it as a currency would likely harm member states’ economies by destabilizing national currencies and reducing economic independence.

European banks in Russia

A banker is a professional who is responsible for managing the financial transactions of clients. Bankers provide financial advice to clients and help them with investments, loans, and other financial services. Bankers should have a good understanding of financial markets, banking regulations, and accounting principles. A few short weeks from now, we will be asked to place our trust in politicians at the ballot box. Sadly, this does not reflect a sudden surge in the popularity of the political parties. It has more to do with the fact that even those with the most sensitive political antennae are struggling to predict the outcome. As a result, people will believe that their vote is more likely to make a difference and, so the logic goes, be more eager to put their cross in the box. 

Bankers, like politicians, too often lose sight of their purpose. The crash exposed some ugly truths about the way some big banks and bankers gained an overweening sense of entitlement and, over many years, systematically and cynically abused their position and customers. The covenant of trust between banks and their customers was broken. Hubris had indeed led to nemesis.

EU banks still operating in Russia are squirming to show they're abandoning their ever-more toxic client — but actions speak louder than words. Some banks pulled out of Russia a long time ago, but a lot of people didn't and now they've been caught with their pants down. Austria's top lender, Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI), made €1.8bn in pre-tax profit in Russia last year. Following earlier briefings with German lenders, the US has threatened Austria's top bank with sanctions for doing business in Russia.

RBI is one of eight leading EU banks still in Russia. The others are Dutch lender ING, Germany's Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank, Hungary's OTP Bank, Italy's Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit, and Sweden's SEB. The US Treasury warned Austria's Raiffeisen Bank International (RBI) that it risked "being cut off from the US financial system" if it was helping to fund Russia's military.

OTP Bank, which used to be on Ukraine's Sponsors of War list, posted a 125 percent increase in its Russia profit in 2023, pocketing €242m. It has 82 retail branches in Russia and employs 2,018 people there. The US Treasury didn't reply if Morris might come knocking on OTP Bank's door in Budapest in the future. 

But US Treasury officials have also briefed German financiers on the new sanctions threat. Commerzbank does corporate banking for mostly German companies active in Russia. It doesn't disclose its Russian profit and employs about 130 people there. ING also does corporate banking in Russia, where its Moscow office employs some 270 people and manages €1.3bn of loans. The Dutch bank said it didn't feel at risk because it "complies with all international sanctions laws including UN, EU, and OFAC".

We trust people who are clear and open with us, with nothing to hide. In a similar vein, we trust people we can rely on, who dependably do what they say they will. We trust people who show they trust and respect us, and those prepared to act against their own self- or short-term interests on our behalf. Lastly, we respond to those whose values we share, who live by those values and don’t contradict them. Some are hoping that if they can keep their head down, the whole thing will blow over and they can have good business in Russia afterwards. Some are afraid of violating any Putin decree because they don’t want personal cases opened up against them. Some are just paralyzed by fear. These are not people who ever imagined, despite all the warnings, that they would be in the middle of this murderous war where they could get killed in the crossfire.

Investigation - Ukraine attacks Russia!

 

This article was written as part of the combat disinformation.

"Ukraine attacks Russia!” was the surreal headline on a report in the 22 February edition of Informer, Serbia’s biggest-selling tabloid. That headline was not a one-off, it was an expression of the Putinophilia that has been strong in Serbia for years. This story was also mentioned in the BBC’s report on the events the day before as an example of Russian disinformation. “There is no evidence to suggest that any of these things happened, but officials are forced to deny any claim, no matter how absurd or unlikely,” BBC correspondent Paul Adams wrote on 21 February. Towards the end of the article, Informer also published brief information that the Ukrainian government denied the attacks on Russia and called the reports fabricated.

The first version of the front page of Večernje novosti, another pro-government newspaper, from 22 February, also published information about the murder of five Ukrainian soldiers. That information was removed from the printed version that was available in Belgrade that day, probably after it was marked as fake news. The front page of the Informer a day later, on 23 February, reported that “Putin checkmated Ukraine”, and that, the day after Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk, the Ukrainians are backing down and that “there would be no war”. As most of the world condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, much of the media in Serbia turned to the glorification of Russia’s actions. Tabloids, web portals, dailies, weeklies, and national television channels celebrated the destruction of Ukrainian cities and gave wholehearted support to Russian armed forces. The killing of civilians, the leveling of cities, and the destruction of cultural monuments appeared to fill some of Serbia’s editors with enthusiasm and exuberance.

Pro-Russia rallies took place in Belgrade, at which the crowd cheered Putin and the letter Z was scrawled on the asphalt. The rest of the world shuddered as it watched real-time coverage of corpses on the streets of Bucha, civilians sheltering from Russian shells in underground stations, and millions of refugees fleeing their country, but instead of compassion for innocent victims, understanding for the criminals seemed the response of Putin’s Serbian fans.

If President Aleksandar Vučić’s allies in the Serb media appear sanguine about death and destruction in Ukraine, he claims that the country is politically neutral. Serbia has grudgingly voted in favor of the UN general assembly’s resolutions condemning Russia’s use of force in the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. But the Vučić government has repeatedly refused to back western sanctions against Russia. European officials, US senators, and various envoys have flocked to Vučić, telling him that it was time to choose: would Serbia be part of Europe or an ally of Russia? Despite all the pressure, Vučić keeps Serbia in limbo.

But there can be no neutrality when it comes to Russia’s campaign against Ukraine. To remain neutral while an executioner butchers a victim means morally siding with the executioner.

Serbia’s attitude towards the war in Ukraine requires additional context. Whereas in other countries, the Russian state-owned news agency, Sputnik, and the Russian TV channel RT diffuse the Kremlin’s propaganda, in Serbia most of the domestic media act as if they themselves are part of the Russian machinery under the command of the Kremlin’s communications supervisors. The problem is not limited to the media. Serbia has never renounced the Greater Serbia nationalist ideology that led to the wars of the former Yugoslavia. The one exception was the short premiership of Zoran Đinđić, but that was cut short by his assassination in 2003.

Today’s Serb political leaders were participants in the wars of the 1990s. Vučić was a high-ranking official of the Serbian Radical party of convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj. His coalition partner Ivica Dačić, leader of the Socialist party of Serbia, was Slobodan Milošević’s spokesman. One of Vučić’s closest associates, the minister of the interior, Aleksandar Vulin, began his career as a functionary of the Yugoslav Left, the party founded by Milošević’s late wife, Mirjana Marković. Today’s minister for European integration, Jadranka Joksimović, worked on the Serbian Radical party’s magazine, Velika Srbija, whose title (Greater Serbia) speaks for itself.

Serbian political leaders still don’t publicly acknowledge Srebrenica as genocide. If at all, they refer to the “terrible crimes” committed. But there has been no dealing with the past at the state level. On the contrary, political, media, cultural, church, and social elites continue to deny Serbian responsibility for war crimes. Serbia’s recent historical revisionism suggests that it was Serbs who were the victims, never the criminals. Internationally convicted Serb war criminals return home after serving their sentences and are given heroes’ welcomes, sinecures, and media space to expound their version of the truth, which The Hague tribunal was of course, unable to understand.

Murals sport the image of Ratko Mladić often with the slogan “Serbian hero” in cities all over Serbia. Anyone who speaks about Serbian crimes is smeared as a traitor by a media lynch mob. At the Serbian war crimes prosecutor’s office, 2,500 cases have been languishing at the pre-trial investigation stage for years. According to estimates by the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, at least 6,000 unconvicted war criminals freely walk the streets of Serbian cities.

For far-right Serb nationalists, the current state of peace in the Balkans is temporary, just like the borders. They still dream of a great Serbian state that will encompass Kosovo, Montenegro, Republika Srpska, and parts of Croatia. The realization of that dream is not possible as things stand, but the nationalists are patient. After defeat in the Yugoslav wars, they retreated to lick their wounds, fuel hatred towards their neighbors, and keep the population in a state of combat readiness via the media. That they must bide their time until international circumstances change has been one of the main narratives of Russian propaganda for the Serbian market filtered through parts of the Serb media for more than two decades.

Serb ultra-nationalists have waited for Russia to enter into a decisive conflict with the western antichrist, to defeat godless Europe, and the USand to establish a different world order. They have placed their faith in Putin as a messiah and imagine him as an upgraded version of Slobodan Milošević: the ruler of a powerful empire with a nuclear arsenal at his disposal.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin’s followers here thought their hour had come; this was the beginning of the great upheaval in which the old order would be razed and from its ruins, a world would arise where sovereignty, borders, and international treaties were of no import. Instead of international law and other western trifles, the law of the jungle would prevail, as authoritarian tradition dictates. States such as Serbia, favored by the world’s ruler enthroned in the Kremlin would gain the right to finish what they started three decades ago to finally create the enlarged state for which they have been longing for centuries, to fit their own imagined grandeur.

Lauding Russia’s criminal aggression against a sovereign country may seem strange to the uninformed. But for those of us who live in the heart of darkness, a country whose heroes are Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, and Ratko Mladić, we expect nothing better. Those who still believe conspiracy theories about the 1994 massacre in Sarajevo’s Markale that it was staged and the dismembered corpses were actually dummies, will easily believe similar propaganda about the massacres of civilians in Bucha. If media hyenas can deride the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on primetime TV, why would they grieve for the victims of Putin’s crimes? As the great Serbian writer and thinker, Radomir Konstantinović said in 1991: “We live in a world (if this is living) in which the monstrous is coming to be natural, and the natural monstrous.” His diagnosis of Serbia has, unfortunately, lost none of its accuracy.

This article is part of a series, published in collaboration with Voxeurop, featuring perspectives on the invasion of Ukraine from the former Soviet bloc and bordering countries. Be informed. Participate. Talk. Provide support. We believe that news is a public good; the support of our readers will ensure that our blog remains independent. Reporting on Europe and the world from a European point of view, encouraging the exchange of ideas across borders and languages: this is the enormous journalistic task we have undertaken and the civic adventure we invite you to undertake. Let's create a benchmark for European media of civil society and citizens.

Links to published articles:

Voice of America, 2 March 2022, https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

European Western Balkan https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/03/23/rooting-for-russia-then-blaming-the-west-evolution-of-serbian-tabloids-reporting-on-the-war-in-ukraine/

Voice of America, 2. March 2022, https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

Istinomer, 11. Mart 2022, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istinomer, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istraga - Ukrajina napala Rusiju!

Ovaj članak je napisan u sklopu borbe protiv dezinformacija.

Ova je priča spomenuta i u BBC-jevom izvješću o događajima dan ranije kao primjer ruske dezinformacije. "Nema dokaza koji upućuju na to da se bilo koja od ovih stvari dogodila, ali dužnosnici su prisiljeni poreći bilo kakvu tvrdnju, bez obzira koliko apsurdna ili malo vjerojatna", napisao je 21. veljače dopisnik BBC-ja Paul Adams. Pred kraj teksta Informer je objavio i kratku informaciju da je ukrajinska vlada demantirala napade na Rusiju i nazvala izvješća izmišljenima.

Prva verzija naslovnice Večernjih novosti, još jednog provladinog lista, od 22. veljače također je objavila informaciju o ubojstvu petorice ukrajinskih vojnika. Ta je informacija uklonjena iz tiskane verzije koja je tog dana bila dostupna u Beogradu, vjerojatno nakon što je označena kao lažna vijest. Naslovnica Informera dan kasnije, 23. veljače, objavila je da je “Putin šah-matirao Ukrajinu”, a dan nakon što je Rusija priznala neovisnost Donjecka i Luganska, Ukrajinci se povlače i da “rata ne bi bilo”.

Odnos Srbije prema ratu u Ukrajini zahtijeva dodatni kontekst. Dok u drugim zemljama ruska državna novinska agencija Sputnik i ruski TV kanal RT šire propagandu Kremlja, u Srbiji se većina domaćih medija ponaša kao da su i sami dio ruske mašinerije pod zapovjedništvom Kremlja. Problem naravno nije ograničen samo na medije. Srbija se nikada nije odrekla velikosrpske nacionalističke ideologije koja je dovela do ratova u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Jedina iznimka bila je kratka premijerska vladavina Zorana Đinđića, ali to je prekinuto njegovim ubojstvom 2003. godine.

Današnje srpske političke vođe bile su sudionice ratova devedesetih. Vučić je bio visoki dužnosnik Srpske radikalne stranke osuđenog ratnog zločinca Vojislava Šešelja. Njegov koalicijski partner Ivica Dačić, čelnik Socijalističke partije Srbije, bio je glasnogovornik Slobodana Miloševića. Jedan od najbližih Vučićevih suradnika, ministar unutarnjih poslova Aleksandar Vulin, karijeru je započeo kao dužnosnik Jugoslavenske ljevice, stranke koju je osnovala Miloševićeva pokojna supruga Mirjana Marković. Današnja ministrica za europske integracije Jadranka Joksimović radila je u časopisu Srpske radikalne stranke Velika Srbija, čiji naziv (Velika Srbija) govori sam za sebe. Srpski politički lideri još uvijek javno ne priznaju Srebrenicu kao genocid. Suočavanja s prošlošću na državnoj razini nije bilo. Naprotiv, političke, medijske, kulturne, crkvene i društvene elite i dalje negiraju odgovornost Srbije za ratne zločine. Nedavni povijesni revizionizam u Srbiji sugerira da su Srbi bili žrtve, a ne zločinci. Međunarodno osuđeni srpski ratni zločinci vraćaju se kući nakon odslužene kazne, pa bivaju dočekani kao heroji i dobivaju medijski prostor da iznesu svoju verziju istine za koju vjeruju da Haaški sud, naravno, nije mogao razumjeti.

Za ekstremno desne srpske nacionaliste mir na Balkanu samo je privremen, baš kao što su i granice. I dalje sanjaju veliku srpsku državu koja će obuhvaćati Kosovo, Crnu Goru, Republiku Srpsku i dijelove Hrvatske. Ostvarenje tog sna nije sada moguće, ali nacionalisti su strpljivi. Nakon poraza u jugoslavenskim ratovima povukli su se kako bi lizali rane, raspirivali mržnju prema susjedima i putem medija držali stanovništvo u stanju borbene pripravnosti. ‘Moramo čekati dok se međunarodne okolnosti ne promijene‘, jedan je od glavnih narativa ruske propagande plasiran na srpsko tržište, a koji se filtrira kroz dijelove srpskih medija više od dva desetljeća.

Srpski ultranacionalisti čekali su da Rusija uđe u ‘odlučujući sukob sa zapadnim antikristom, da porazi bezbožnu Europu i SAD i uspostavi drugačiji svjetski poredak‘. Povjerovali su u Putina kao mesiju i zamišljaju ga kao nadograđenu verziju Slobodana Miloševića: vladara moćnog carstva s nuklearnim arsenalom na raspolaganju.

Kada je Rusija napala Ukrajinu, Putinovi sljedbenici mislili su da je došao njihov čas; to je bio početak velikog preokreta u kojem će stari poredak biti srušen i iz njegovih ruševina nastati svijet u kojem suverenitet, granice i međunarodni ugovori nisu bili važni. Umjesto međunarodnog prava i ostalih zapadnjačkih sitnica, zavladao bi zakon džungle, kako autoritarna tradicija nalaže. Države poput Srbije, kako oni vjeruju omiljene od strane vladara ustoličenog u Kremlju, stekle bi pravo da dovrše ono što su započele prije tri desetljeća

Hvaljenje ruske zločinačke agresije na suverenu zemlju neupućenima može izgledati čudno. Ali, kako kaže mi koji živimo u srcu tame, zemlje čiji su heroji Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić i Ratko Mladić, ne očekujemo ništa bolje.

Oni koji još uvijek vjeruju u teorije zavjere o masakru na sarajevskim Markalama 1994. godine da je namješten i da su raskomadani leševi zapravo lutke, lako će povjerovati sličnoj propagandi o masakru civila u Buči. Ako se medijske hijene mogu rugati žrtvama genocida u Srebrenici u udarnom TV terminu, zašto bi žalile za žrtvama Putinovih zločina? Kako je veliki srpski pisac i mislilac Radomir Konstantinović rekao 1991. godine: “Živimo u svijetu (ako je ovo život) u kojem čudovišno postaje prirodno, a prirodno čudovišno.” Njegova dijagnoza Srbije, nažalost, nije ništa izgubila na točnosti.

Ovaj je članak dio serije, objavljene u suradnji s Voxeuropom, koja prikazuje perspektive invazije na Ukrajinu iz bivšeg sovjetskog bloka i susjednih zemalja. Budite informirani. Sudjelujte. Razgovarajte. Pružite podršku. Vjerujemo da su vijesti javno dobro; podrška naših čitatelja osigurat će da naš blog ostane neovisan. Izvještavanje o Europi i svijetu s europskog stajališta, poticanje razmjene ideja preko granica i jezika: ovo je golemi novinarski zadatak koji smo preuzeli i građanska avantura na koju vas pozivamo. Stvorimo mjerilo za europske medije civilnog društva i građana.

Poveznice na objavljene članke:

Glas Amerike, 2. mart 2022., https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

European Western Balkans https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/03/23/rooting-for-russia-then-blaming-the-west-evolution-of-serbian-tabloids-reporting-on-the-war-in-ukraine/

Glas Amerike, 2. mart 2022., https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

Istinomer, 11. mart 2022, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istinomer, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

The most potent weapon - Geoengineering

The most potent weapon against the EU may be the weather. How the next phase of Moscow's energy war plays out in large part depends on something no politician or scientists can control — the weather. Hmm... It's time to prepare for technologies that manipulate the climate.

Sticks of silver iodide are fired into the atmosphere to produce precipitation. Tiny particles are suspended in the stratosphere to block the sun's rays. Massive filters and underground pumps can siphon carbon from the air.

Geoengineering, the intentional manipulation of the climate, is quickly emerging as a tool to address global warming. Even though these technologies could have world-altering consequences, there is no international agreement or enforcement mechanism that directly addresses geoengineering. Without regulation, it would only take one country—watching its crops shrivel or its water run dry—taking a chance to set a global climate experiment in motion, potentially leading to conflict. And then, there’s the Russian Federation. Geoengineering ideas have a long history in Russia—and now, they appear to be moving to the next scientific level.

Although so far it has received little or no attention, the journal Russian Meteorology and Hydrology recently published a new kind of geoengineering study whose lead author is the journal’s editor, the prominent Russian scientist Yuri A. Izrael. Known for his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, his skepticism of human-caused global warming, and his enthusiasm for geoengineering, Izrael also happens to be a top scientific adviser to Vladimir Putin. And now, his paper reports on what is probably the very first geoengineering field trial. Izrael and his team of scientists mounted aerosol generators on a helicopter and a car chassis and proceeded to blast out particles at ground level and at heights of up to 200 meters. Then they attempted to measure just how much sunlight reaching the earth was reduced due to the aerosol plume.

This small-scale intervention was effective, the Russian scientists say. And in an accompanying article on geoengineering alternatives, Izrael and colleagues note that “Already in the near future, the technological possibilities of a full-scale use of [aerosol-based geoengineering] will be studied.”

Up until now, scientists have largely studied the possibilities of geoengineering in relatively unthreatening computer models—not out in nature itself. They’ve just run a series of simulations to try to assess likely impacts. In this context, the apparent trajectory of Russian research sounds like something quite new. And it may prompt increasing calls for regulation of geoengineering interventions, even at the small-scale research level where environmental consequences would be relatively minimal.

 The time to establish international agreements on geoengineering is now, while the risks are still theoretical. In particular, any further devastating climate impacts, particularly to vulnerable low-lying developing countries, may draw new calls for geoengineering research or interventions. And given the current state of deliberations in Copenhagen, that’s the scariest thing of all. 

More info: https://map.geoengineeringmonitor.org/

Geoengineering is the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s natural systems to counteract climate change.

There is a wide range of proposed geoengineering techniques. Generally, these can be grouped into two categories:

Solar Radiation Management (SRM) or Solar Geoengineering

SRM techniques aim to reflect a small proportion of the Sun’s energy back into space, counteracting the temperature rise caused by increased levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere which absorb energy and raise temperatures. Some proposed techniques include:

Albedo enhancement. Increasing the reflectiveness of clouds or the land surface so that more of the Sun’s heat is reflected back into space.

Space reflectors. Blocking a small proportion of sunlight before it reaches the Earth.

Stratospheric aerosols. Introducing small, reflective particles into the upper atmosphere to reflect some sunlight before it reaches the surface of the Earth.

Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR)  or Carbon Geoengineering

GGR techniques aim to remove carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, directly countering the increased greenhouse effect and ocean acidification. These techniques would have to be implemented on a global scale to have a significant impact on greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere.  Some proposed techniques include:

Afforestation.  Engaging in a global-scale tree planting effort.

Biochar.  'Charring' biomass and burying it so that its carbon is locked up in the soil.

Bio-energy with carbon capture and sequestration.  Growing biomass, burning it to create energy, and capturing and sequestering the carbon dioxide created in the process.

Ambient Air Capture.  Building large machines that can remove carbon dioxide directly from ambient air and store it elsewhere.

Ocean Fertilisation.  Adding nutrients to the ocean in selected locations increases primary production which draws down carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

Enhanced Weathering.  Exposing large quantities of minerals that will react with carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and storing the resulting compound in the ocean or soil.

Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement.  Grinding up, dispersing, and dissolving rocks such as limestone, silicates, or calcium hydroxide in the ocean increases its ability to store carbon and directly ameliorate ocean acidification.

EU sanctions against Russia explained

The EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia in response to the military aggression against Ukraine. Find out what this means in practice.

Since Russia’s recognition of the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine on 21 February 2022 and the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia. 

They add to existing measures imposed on Russia since 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Sanctions include targeted restrictive measures (individual sanctions), economic sanctions, and diplomatic measures.

The aim of the economic sanctions is to impose severe consequences on Russia for its actions and to thwart the Russian ability to continue the aggression effectively.

The individual sanctions target people responsible for supporting, financing, or implementing actions that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine or who benefit from these actions.

The EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus in response to its involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.

The sanctions do not block the export and transactions related to food and agricultural products.

EU leaders stressed at the European Council on 23-24 June 2022 that Russia is solely responsible for the global food crisis and that EU sanctions do not target food and agricultural products. Food security and affordability are key priorities for the EU and its member states.

EU sanctions do not impact food security and cover only bilateral trade between the EU and Russia – not international trade.​

EU sanctions explicitly exclude food supplies and fertilizers: there are no sanctions on Russian exports of food to global markets. Anyone can operate, buy, transport, and ensure food and fertilizers coming out of Russia.

The restrictions on the import of certain potash fertilizers under the EU sanctions only apply to products imported to the EU and do not concern exports of them to Ukraine from the EU or from Russia.

The EU has also made exceptions within its sanctions: although European airspace is not open to Russian aircraft, EU member states can authorize overflight of their airspace by Russian aircraft if that is required for humanitarian purposes. EU member states are also authorized to grant Russian-flagged vessels access to EU ports and Russian road carriers entry to the EU for importing or transporting agricultural products, including fertilizers and wheat, that are not subject to restrictions.

In total, also taking into account earlier individual sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU has sanctioned 108 entities and 1206 individuals. The list includes:

Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin

Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov

pro-Russian former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych

oligarchs linked to the Kremlin, such as Roman Abramovich

351 members of the Russian State Duma (the lower house of parliament) who voted in favor of the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk on 15 February 2022

members of the National Security Council

local politicians such as the mayor of Moscow 

high-ranking officials and military personnel

prominent businesspeople (i.e. people active in the Russian steel industry and others who provide financial services, military products, and technology to the Russian state)

propagandists and disinformation actors

individuals responsible for the atrocities committed in Bucha and Mariupol

individuals involved in the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine 

selected family members of some of the abovementioned individuals

Sanctions on individuals consist of travel bans and asset freezes. Travel bans prevent listed individuals from entering or transiting through EU territory, by either land, air, or sea.

Asset freezes mean that all accounts belonging to the listed persons and entities in EU banks are frozen. It is also prohibited to make any funds or assets directly or indirectly available to them.

This ensures that their money can no longer be used to support the Russian regime nor can they try to find a safe haven in the EU.

As part of the economic sanctions, the EU has imposed a number of import and export restrictions on Russia. This means that European entities cannot sell certain products to Russia (export restrictions) and that Russian entities are not allowed to sell certain products to the EU (import restrictions).

The list of banned products is designed to maximize the negative impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens. The export and import restrictions exclude products primarily intended for consumption and products related to health, pharma, food, and agriculture, in order not to harm the Russian population.

The bans are implemented by the EU’s customs authorities.

Moreover, the EU, in collaboration with other like-minded partners, has adopted a statement reserving the right to stop treating Russia as the most favored nation within the WTO framework. The EU has decided to act on this not through an increase in import tariffs, but through restrictive measures that include bans on the import or export of certain goods. The EU and its partners have also suspended any work related to the accession of Belarus to the WTO.

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

crude oil and refined petroleum products, with limited exceptions (with phase-out of 6 to 8 months)

coal and other solid fossil fuels (as there is a wind-down period for existing contracts, this sanction will apply as from August 2022)

gold, including jewelry

steel and iron

wood, cement, and certain fertilizers

seafood and liquor (e.g. caviar, vodka)

In June 2022, the Council adopted the sixth package of sanctions that, among others, prohibits the purchase, import, or transfer of crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU. The restrictions will apply gradually: within six months for crude oil and within eight months for other refined petroleum products.

A temporary exception is foreseen for imports of crude oil by pipeline into those EU member states that, due to their geographic situation, suffer from a specific dependence on Russian supplies and have no viable alternative options.

Moreover, Bulgaria and Croatia specifically will benefit from temporary derogations concerning the import of Russian seaborne crude oil and vacuum gas oil respectively.

As the majority of the Russian oil delivered to the EU is seaborne, these restrictions will cover nearly 90% of Russian oil imports to Europe by the end of the year. This will significantly reduce Russia’s trade profits.

The EU has prohibited Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering the EU, including for goods in transit.

This sanction aims to restrict the Russian industry’s capacity to acquire key goods and to disrupt road trade both to and from Russia. However, EU countries can grant derogations for:

the transport of energy

the transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid purposes

transport related to the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the EU and its countries in Russia, or of international organizations in Russia which enjoy immunities in accordance with international law

the transfer or export to Russia of cultural goods on loan in the context of formal cultural cooperation with Russia

The ban does not affect mail services and goods in transit between Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia.

In February 2022, the EU refused access to EU airports for Russian carriers of all kinds and banned them from overflying EU airspace. This means that airplanes registered in Russia or elsewhere and leased or rented to a Russian citizen or entity cannot land at any EU airports and cannot fly over EU countries. Private aircraft, e.g. private business jets, are included in the ban.

In addition, the EU banned the export to Russia of goods and technology in the aviation and space industry.

Insurance services, maintenance services, and technical assistance related to these goods and technology are also prohibited. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom imposed similar restrictions.

This means that Russian airlines cannot buy any aircraft, spare parts, or equipment for their fleet and cannot perform the necessary repairs or technical inspections. As three-quarters of Russia’s current commercial air fleet were produced in the EU, the US, or Canada, over time the ban is likely to result in the grounding of a significant proportion of the Russian civil aviation fleet, even for domestic flights.

The EU has closed its ports to Russia's entire merchant fleet of over 2 800 vessels. However, the measure does not affect vessels carrying:

energy

pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid

nuclear fuel and other goods necessary for the functioning of civil nuclear capabilities

coal (until 10 August 2022, after which imports of coal into the EU will be banned)

The measure also does not affect vessels in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, or vessels making an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety or saving life at sea.

The ban will also apply to vessels that try to evade the sanctions by changing their Russian flag or registration to that of another state. Port authorities can identify an attempt to reflag or change registration by checking a vessel’s IMO number (the unique identification number assigned on behalf of the International Maritime Organization).

The ban prevents ten Russian and four Belarusian banks from making or receiving international payments using SWIFT.

SWIFT is a messaging service that substantially facilitates information exchange between banks and other financial institutions. SWIFT connects more than 11 000 entities worldwide.

As a result, these banks can neither get foreign currency (as a transfer of foreign currencies between two banks is generally processed as a transfer abroad involving a foreign intermediary bank) nor transfer assets abroad. This has negative consequences for the Russian and Belarusian economies.

Technically, banks could carry out international transactions without SWIFT, but it is expensive, complex, and requires mutual trust between financial institutions. It brings payments back to the times when telephone and fax were used to confirm each transaction.

The European Union has prohibited all transactions with the National Central Bank of Russia related to the management of the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and assets. As a result of the central bank asset freeze, the central bank can no longer access the assets it has stored in central banks and private institutions in the EU.

In February 2022, Russia’s international reserves accounted for $643 billion (€579 billion). Among other purposes, having reserves in foreign currencies helps keep the exchange rate of a country’s own currency stable.

Due to the ban on transactions from the EU and other countries, it is estimated that more than half of Russian reserves are frozen. The ban was also imposed by other countries (such as the US, Canada, and the UK) which also store a share of Russia’s foreign reserves.

Consequently, Russia cannot use this cushion of foreign assets to provide funds to its banks and thus limit the effects of other sanctions. Even the gold reserves stored in Russia now appear to be more difficult to sell due to international sanctions affecting Russian entities.

The EU has also prohibited the sale, supply, transfer, and export of euro-denominated banknotes to Russia. The aim is to limit access to cash in euros by the Russian government, its Central Bank, and natural or legal persons in Russia with a view to preventing the circumvention of sanctions.

Similar sanctions apply to Belarus.

The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of disinformation, information manipulation, and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilizing both its neighboring countries and the EU and its member states.

To counteract this, the EU has suspended the broadcasting activities in the EU of five Russian state-owned outlets:

Sputnik

Russia Today

Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta

Rossiya 24/Russia 24

TV Centre International

Russia uses all these state-owned outlets to intentionally spread propaganda and conduct disinformation campaigns, including about its military aggression against Ukraine.

The restrictions against Sputnik and Russia Today (together with their subsidiaries, such as RT English, RT Germany, RT France, and RT Spanish) have been in place since 2 March 2022. The restrictions on the other three entities have been in place as of 4 June 2022.

They cover all means of transmission and distribution in or directed at the EU member states, including cable, satellite, Internet Protocol TV, platforms, websites, and apps.

In line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, these measures will not prevent those media outlets and their staff from carrying out activities in the EU other than broadcasting, e.g. research and interviews.

Sanctions are more effective if a broad range of international partners is involved. The EU has worked closely over the last few weeks with like-minded partners such as the United States in order to coordinate sanctions.

The EU is working with the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international partners to prevent Russia from obtaining financing from such institutions.

To coordinate this international effort, the newly formed Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force allow the EU to cooperate with the G7 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as well as with Australia, to ensure sanctions are implemented.

Although the EU works closely with many partners, each of these non-EU countries decides unilaterally which sanctions it will impose.

All EU sanctions are fully compliant with obligations under international law, whilst respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Once political agreement is reached among EU member states, the necessary legal acts are prepared by the European External Action Service and/or the European Commission and submitted to the Council for adoption.

Council regulations and decisions, as legal acts of general application, are binding on any person or entity under EU jurisdiction. This means any person or entity within the EU, any EU national in any location, and all companies and organizations incorporated under the law of an EU member state.