Europe’s shift to a low-carbon future

Around three-quarters of the EU’s total population live in cities and suburban areas, and this proportion is projected to increase. Cities are also responsible for a large proportion of carbon emissions. The dynamism and density of cities mean that they have great potential to become models for low-carbon lifestyles. Urban prosumers can make a critical contribution to decarbonizing their communities.

Municipalities can support prosumers by providing publicly owned spaces or encouraging other private buildings or landowners to offer spaces that can be used for citizen-led energy generation. These can include rooftops of schools, hospitals, apartments, or unused lands which can be used to install solar panels or other renewable energy technologies. Local authorities can also offer targeted financial incentives for companies to promote citizen participation and encourage public involvement in energy planning. Municipalities can also act as information hubs and contribute to building the right skills to help those interested in installing renewables.

Each city is unique but they have some common attributes that establish a setting for prosumption that is distinct from more rural areas, for example:

Establishing prosumption in cities is more challenging than in rural areas because of the limited space available for energy generation and the more complex arrangements for the ownership of surfaces (such as rooftops in apartment blocks).

Cities are more densely populated than rural areas, making rooftop solar technology the renewable technology of choice. High population densities also make heat grids more profitable, offering the potential to develop prosumer initiatives related to heat grids in cities.

More people live in apartment blocks, which opens opportunities for collective action but makes it harder to coordinate investment.

Short travel distances make cities ideal for using electric vehicles, both private and public. Urban prosumer concepts are more likely to involve coupling with mobility.

Cities can offer opportunities for developing integrated energy districts, for example, when areas within a city are redeveloped or new areas are added.

Generating electricity outside the city (off-site generation) opens up possibilities for prosumers to overcome the lack of space.

Prosumers of renewable energy can make a critical contribution to decarbonizing their communities. Prosumers are defined as entities — individuals, households, small or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), or institutions — that actively participate in the energy system. Active participation can be through self-generating renewable heat or power, and also through providing energy system services such as demand flexibility and energy storage services, enabling larger amounts of intermittent wind and solar energy to be integrated into the system. Prosumers can act as individuals (e.g. a single household) or as part of a collective (e.g. a block of apartments or an energy community). A comprehensive overview of prosumers and the different models of prosumption is available in the recent EEA report Energy prosumers in Europe: citizen participation in the energy transition (EEA, 2022b).

Each city is unique, with its own characteristics and solutions. However, cities have some common attributes that establish a setting for prosumption that is distinct from the setting in more rural areas. For example:

Cities are more densely populated than rural areas, making rooftop solar technology the renewable technology of choice rather than technologies that require open space, such as wind turbines. The higher population density of cities also makes heat grids more profitable than in rural areas, thus offering the potential to develop prosumer initiatives related to heat grids in cities.

More people live in apartment blocks in cities. This makes it harder to coordinate investment since it requires agreement among several people with different interests and financial capabilities.

Short travel distances make cities ideal for using electric vehicles, both private and public. Urban prosumer concepts are thus more likely to involve coupling between the energy and mobility sectors, for example in the form of onsite renewable energy plants delivering power for charging electric vehicles.

Cities can offer opportunities for developing integrated energy districts, for example when areas within a city are redeveloped or new areas are added. Integrated energy districts often use a variety of energy technologies and are used by a variety of interconnected sectors.

Apartment blocks have a smaller rooftop area per inhabitant than houses. Depending on the architecture and height of the buildings, shadowing effects from neighboring buildings may also limit the area of a rooftop that is suitable for solar photovoltaic (PV) energy generation. At the same time, a high population density will mean a high energy demand close to the point of energy generation, minimizing transmission losses. This combination of relatively low generation potential and high energy demand highlights the importance of maximizing the use of suitable rooftops for energy generation in cities.

However, organizing investment for a joint PV plant or implementing collective self-consumption in an apartment block is significantly more complicated than doing so in a single-family home. Different ownership structures and country-specific regulations mean that problems and challenges vary. In all cases, however, the relevant parties must discuss and agree on a specific approach to organizing investment in and the operation of the rooftop system. The collaborative nature of this model can have positive effects on the community, although it can also pose a barrier to prosumer projects if agreements cannot be reached. An alternative to collaborative investment is to lease the rooftop to a third-party operator and for apartment block owners to receive some of the energy generated in lieu of lease payments.

Outside the scope of municipalities, national housing policies have an important impact on the deployment of rooftop PV energy systems in apartment blocks. Decision-making and access to finance may be easier when the building is owned by a single entity rather than multiple private owners. Therefore, countries with high shares of social housing, housing associations, or large landlords might make more progress in this regard than countries with lower shares.

The possibility of generating electricity in one location and consuming it elsewhere, known as an offsite generation, enables many citizens to become prosumers irrespective of the space they have available. Virtual net metering is one option used in offsite prosumption models. With virtual net metering, prosumers can generate electricity outside the city (e.g. at a second home or as part of an energy community) and inject this electricity into the grid. The prosumers then get a discount on their household energy bills based on the energy generated. National regulation should support offsite prosumption concepts. However, as offsite prosumption requires the use of the national electricity grid, grid fees and other related costs must be taken into account and covered by the offsite generation project.

In an integrated energy district (often a newly built or converted area), inhabitants can actively participate in a local energy system that integrates electricity, heating, and mobility. As a simplified example, an integrated energy district can generate its own renewable energy, providing electricity to the community, for instance by providing charging points for a local electric car-sharing scheme. At the same time, it can power a small district heating network supplemented with heat pumps. This integration between different sectors is sometimes referred to as ‘sector coupling’.

The concrete implementation and ownership arrangements necessarily differ between districts, depending on local conditions and the participants involved[1]. For example, an energy cooperative could invest in and operate the energy system. Alternatively, a commercial entity could manage the energy aspect of the district and offer inhabitants the option to get involved when they move into the area.

In integrated energy districts, citizens can participate as advisers, idea providers, and discussion partners during the development process if the community’s planning and development approach allows this. Furthermore, citizens can act as investors, contributing their own money, time, labor, skills, and expertise. This could happen in different ‘legal’ or regulatory settings such as working groups, initiatives, associations, cooperatives, or as part of private non-profit or for-profit organizations.

Cities can play a very important role in enabling prosumption, even if the main relevant laws and regulatory frameworks are set at a national level.

Cities often own public buildings (e.g. schools, sports facilities, administrative buildings) and dominate shares of public companies (e.g. housing associations or local utility providers), as well as owning land areas within the city. Thus, municipalities can use their own buildings for prosumption or allocate unused lands, such as brownfield land or railway margins, to local energy communities for energy generation. They can encourage publicly owned companies to initiate and invest in collective prosumer models (Becker et al., 2017). In the case of private companies, municipal governments can use their convening power to bring key local stakeholders together and — possibly — initiate memoranda of understanding with the same aim.

Municipal authorities can set up their own support schemes when such approaches are deemed desirable and compatible with national law. This could be in the form of direct financial support for projects or indirect support through tax relief. They could also procure locally produced electricity and increase the visibility of citizen-led projects and initiatives (Haf and Robison, 2020).

In addition, municipalities can set requirements or terms and conditions for awarding energy infrastructure concessions to companies or initiatives that enable citizens to participate in decision-making processes.

Municipalities are usually responsible for many energy-related decisions. Integrated energy planning and management are often central tasks of municipalities, in collaboration with regional and national authorities. Through the development of dedicated masterplans and strategies, municipalities can lay down their ambitions for the energy transformation, make it clear who is accountable for progress and clarify what the role of citizens should be in the decarbonization process. Critically, the development of these local masterplans should involve citizens, in a participatory process, so that inhabitants, as important stakeholders, are consulted and can express their opinions (Judson et al., 2020).

For citizens to take an active role in local planning, municipal authorities need to be approachable, with an open-door policy, and adopt participative governance strategies (Haf and Robison, 2020). In addition, a framework for cooperation among local stakeholders, such as municipalities, energy communities, energy utility providers and citizens, should be put in place.

Developing and implementing prosumer concepts often requires high levels of expertise and specialist knowledge in many different areas. Information is usually dispersed across several stakeholders. Actor constellations and interactions are often unique, which might lead to considerable transaction costs for aspiring prosumers. This is particularly true in cities, where becoming a prosumer tends to be more complicated than in rural areas.

As highlighted in the REPowerEU plan and its EU solar strategy, a key action for incentivizing prosumption is to set up one-stop shops that give citizens impartial advice and practical help on roof renovations, solar generation, and energy storage in an integrated manner, covering everything from the technical requirements to the administrative steps and financial support available. Local and regional authorities, and their implementing institutions, such as energy or business support agencies, are well suited to this task, functioning as aggregators of information and facilitators and helping to bring stakeholders together (Bale et al., 2012).

Finally, cities can contribute to addressing the skills shortage, which is becoming an increasingly important barrier to the deployment of prosumer and energy efficiency projects. Adapting vocational training to current needs usually depends on the actions of national or regional authorities, and is constrained by educational regulatory frameworks. Nevertheless, cities can help to ensure that existing skills are put to good use by providing incentives for suitably qualified people to set up businesses. Incentives could include subsidizing workshop space and providing local tax breaks. Municipal authorities can also join the Pact for Skills large-scale skills partnership, as encouraged by the REPowerEU plan.

Investigation - Ukraine attacks Russia!

 

This article was written as part of the combat disinformation.

"Ukraine attacks Russia!” was the surreal headline on a report in the 22 February edition of Informer, Serbia’s biggest-selling tabloid. That headline was not a one-off, it was an expression of the Putinophilia that has been strong in Serbia for years. This story was also mentioned in the BBC’s report on the events the day before as an example of Russian disinformation. “There is no evidence to suggest that any of these things happened, but officials are forced to deny any claim, no matter how absurd or unlikely,” BBC correspondent Paul Adams wrote on 21 February. Towards the end of the article, Informer also published brief information that the Ukrainian government denied the attacks on Russia and called the reports fabricated.

The first version of the front page of Večernje novosti, another pro-government newspaper, from 22 February, also published information about the murder of five Ukrainian soldiers. That information was removed from the printed version that was available in Belgrade that day, probably after it was marked as fake news. The front page of the Informer a day later, on 23 February, reported that “Putin checkmated Ukraine”, and that, the day after Russia recognized the independence of Donetsk and Lugansk, the Ukrainians are backing down and that “there would be no war”. As most of the world condemned Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, much of the media in Serbia turned to the glorification of Russia’s actions. Tabloids, web portals, dailies, weeklies, and national television channels celebrated the destruction of Ukrainian cities and gave wholehearted support to Russian armed forces. The killing of civilians, the leveling of cities, and the destruction of cultural monuments appeared to fill some of Serbia’s editors with enthusiasm and exuberance.

Pro-Russia rallies took place in Belgrade, at which the crowd cheered Putin and the letter Z was scrawled on the asphalt. The rest of the world shuddered as it watched real-time coverage of corpses on the streets of Bucha, civilians sheltering from Russian shells in underground stations, and millions of refugees fleeing their country, but instead of compassion for innocent victims, understanding for the criminals seemed the response of Putin’s Serbian fans.

If President Aleksandar Vučić’s allies in the Serb media appear sanguine about death and destruction in Ukraine, he claims that the country is politically neutral. Serbia has grudgingly voted in favor of the UN general assembly’s resolutions condemning Russia’s use of force in the illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory. But the Vučić government has repeatedly refused to back western sanctions against Russia. European officials, US senators, and various envoys have flocked to Vučić, telling him that it was time to choose: would Serbia be part of Europe or an ally of Russia? Despite all the pressure, Vučić keeps Serbia in limbo.

But there can be no neutrality when it comes to Russia’s campaign against Ukraine. To remain neutral while an executioner butchers a victim means morally siding with the executioner.

Serbia’s attitude towards the war in Ukraine requires additional context. Whereas in other countries, the Russian state-owned news agency, Sputnik, and the Russian TV channel RT diffuse the Kremlin’s propaganda, in Serbia most of the domestic media act as if they themselves are part of the Russian machinery under the command of the Kremlin’s communications supervisors. The problem is not limited to the media. Serbia has never renounced the Greater Serbia nationalist ideology that led to the wars of the former Yugoslavia. The one exception was the short premiership of Zoran Đinđić, but that was cut short by his assassination in 2003.

Today’s Serb political leaders were participants in the wars of the 1990s. Vučić was a high-ranking official of the Serbian Radical party of convicted war criminal Vojislav Šešelj. His coalition partner Ivica Dačić, leader of the Socialist party of Serbia, was Slobodan Milošević’s spokesman. One of Vučić’s closest associates, the minister of the interior, Aleksandar Vulin, began his career as a functionary of the Yugoslav Left, the party founded by Milošević’s late wife, Mirjana Marković. Today’s minister for European integration, Jadranka Joksimović, worked on the Serbian Radical party’s magazine, Velika Srbija, whose title (Greater Serbia) speaks for itself.

Serbian political leaders still don’t publicly acknowledge Srebrenica as genocide. If at all, they refer to the “terrible crimes” committed. But there has been no dealing with the past at the state level. On the contrary, political, media, cultural, church, and social elites continue to deny Serbian responsibility for war crimes. Serbia’s recent historical revisionism suggests that it was Serbs who were the victims, never the criminals. Internationally convicted Serb war criminals return home after serving their sentences and are given heroes’ welcomes, sinecures, and media space to expound their version of the truth, which The Hague tribunal was of course, unable to understand.

Murals sport the image of Ratko Mladić often with the slogan “Serbian hero” in cities all over Serbia. Anyone who speaks about Serbian crimes is smeared as a traitor by a media lynch mob. At the Serbian war crimes prosecutor’s office, 2,500 cases have been languishing at the pre-trial investigation stage for years. According to estimates by the Humanitarian Law Center in Belgrade, at least 6,000 unconvicted war criminals freely walk the streets of Serbian cities.

For far-right Serb nationalists, the current state of peace in the Balkans is temporary, just like the borders. They still dream of a great Serbian state that will encompass Kosovo, Montenegro, Republika Srpska, and parts of Croatia. The realization of that dream is not possible as things stand, but the nationalists are patient. After defeat in the Yugoslav wars, they retreated to lick their wounds, fuel hatred towards their neighbors, and keep the population in a state of combat readiness via the media. That they must bide their time until international circumstances change has been one of the main narratives of Russian propaganda for the Serbian market filtered through parts of the Serb media for more than two decades.

Serb ultra-nationalists have waited for Russia to enter into a decisive conflict with the western antichrist, to defeat godless Europe, and the USand to establish a different world order. They have placed their faith in Putin as a messiah and imagine him as an upgraded version of Slobodan Milošević: the ruler of a powerful empire with a nuclear arsenal at his disposal.

When Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin’s followers here thought their hour had come; this was the beginning of the great upheaval in which the old order would be razed and from its ruins, a world would arise where sovereignty, borders, and international treaties were of no import. Instead of international law and other western trifles, the law of the jungle would prevail, as authoritarian tradition dictates. States such as Serbia, favored by the world’s ruler enthroned in the Kremlin would gain the right to finish what they started three decades ago to finally create the enlarged state for which they have been longing for centuries, to fit their own imagined grandeur.

Lauding Russia’s criminal aggression against a sovereign country may seem strange to the uninformed. But for those of us who live in the heart of darkness, a country whose heroes are Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, and Ratko Mladić, we expect nothing better. Those who still believe conspiracy theories about the 1994 massacre in Sarajevo’s Markale that it was staged and the dismembered corpses were actually dummies, will easily believe similar propaganda about the massacres of civilians in Bucha. If media hyenas can deride the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on primetime TV, why would they grieve for the victims of Putin’s crimes? As the great Serbian writer and thinker, Radomir Konstantinović said in 1991: “We live in a world (if this is living) in which the monstrous is coming to be natural, and the natural monstrous.” His diagnosis of Serbia has, unfortunately, lost none of its accuracy.

This article is part of a series, published in collaboration with Voxeurop, featuring perspectives on the invasion of Ukraine from the former Soviet bloc and bordering countries. Be informed. Participate. Talk. Provide support. We believe that news is a public good; the support of our readers will ensure that our blog remains independent. Reporting on Europe and the world from a European point of view, encouraging the exchange of ideas across borders and languages: this is the enormous journalistic task we have undertaken and the civic adventure we invite you to undertake. Let's create a benchmark for European media of civil society and citizens.

Links to published articles:

Voice of America, 2 March 2022, https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

European Western Balkan https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/03/23/rooting-for-russia-then-blaming-the-west-evolution-of-serbian-tabloids-reporting-on-the-war-in-ukraine/

Voice of America, 2. March 2022, https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

Istinomer, 11. Mart 2022, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istinomer, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istraga - Ukrajina napala Rusiju!

Ovaj članak je napisan u sklopu borbe protiv dezinformacija.

Ova je priča spomenuta i u BBC-jevom izvješću o događajima dan ranije kao primjer ruske dezinformacije. "Nema dokaza koji upućuju na to da se bilo koja od ovih stvari dogodila, ali dužnosnici su prisiljeni poreći bilo kakvu tvrdnju, bez obzira koliko apsurdna ili malo vjerojatna", napisao je 21. veljače dopisnik BBC-ja Paul Adams. Pred kraj teksta Informer je objavio i kratku informaciju da je ukrajinska vlada demantirala napade na Rusiju i nazvala izvješća izmišljenima.

Prva verzija naslovnice Večernjih novosti, još jednog provladinog lista, od 22. veljače također je objavila informaciju o ubojstvu petorice ukrajinskih vojnika. Ta je informacija uklonjena iz tiskane verzije koja je tog dana bila dostupna u Beogradu, vjerojatno nakon što je označena kao lažna vijest. Naslovnica Informera dan kasnije, 23. veljače, objavila je da je “Putin šah-matirao Ukrajinu”, a dan nakon što je Rusija priznala neovisnost Donjecka i Luganska, Ukrajinci se povlače i da “rata ne bi bilo”.

Odnos Srbije prema ratu u Ukrajini zahtijeva dodatni kontekst. Dok u drugim zemljama ruska državna novinska agencija Sputnik i ruski TV kanal RT šire propagandu Kremlja, u Srbiji se većina domaćih medija ponaša kao da su i sami dio ruske mašinerije pod zapovjedništvom Kremlja. Problem naravno nije ograničen samo na medije. Srbija se nikada nije odrekla velikosrpske nacionalističke ideologije koja je dovela do ratova u bivšoj Jugoslaviji. Jedina iznimka bila je kratka premijerska vladavina Zorana Đinđića, ali to je prekinuto njegovim ubojstvom 2003. godine.

Današnje srpske političke vođe bile su sudionice ratova devedesetih. Vučić je bio visoki dužnosnik Srpske radikalne stranke osuđenog ratnog zločinca Vojislava Šešelja. Njegov koalicijski partner Ivica Dačić, čelnik Socijalističke partije Srbije, bio je glasnogovornik Slobodana Miloševića. Jedan od najbližih Vučićevih suradnika, ministar unutarnjih poslova Aleksandar Vulin, karijeru je započeo kao dužnosnik Jugoslavenske ljevice, stranke koju je osnovala Miloševićeva pokojna supruga Mirjana Marković. Današnja ministrica za europske integracije Jadranka Joksimović radila je u časopisu Srpske radikalne stranke Velika Srbija, čiji naziv (Velika Srbija) govori sam za sebe. Srpski politički lideri još uvijek javno ne priznaju Srebrenicu kao genocid. Suočavanja s prošlošću na državnoj razini nije bilo. Naprotiv, političke, medijske, kulturne, crkvene i društvene elite i dalje negiraju odgovornost Srbije za ratne zločine. Nedavni povijesni revizionizam u Srbiji sugerira da su Srbi bili žrtve, a ne zločinci. Međunarodno osuđeni srpski ratni zločinci vraćaju se kući nakon odslužene kazne, pa bivaju dočekani kao heroji i dobivaju medijski prostor da iznesu svoju verziju istine za koju vjeruju da Haaški sud, naravno, nije mogao razumjeti.

Za ekstremno desne srpske nacionaliste mir na Balkanu samo je privremen, baš kao što su i granice. I dalje sanjaju veliku srpsku državu koja će obuhvaćati Kosovo, Crnu Goru, Republiku Srpsku i dijelove Hrvatske. Ostvarenje tog sna nije sada moguće, ali nacionalisti su strpljivi. Nakon poraza u jugoslavenskim ratovima povukli su se kako bi lizali rane, raspirivali mržnju prema susjedima i putem medija držali stanovništvo u stanju borbene pripravnosti. ‘Moramo čekati dok se međunarodne okolnosti ne promijene‘, jedan je od glavnih narativa ruske propagande plasiran na srpsko tržište, a koji se filtrira kroz dijelove srpskih medija više od dva desetljeća.

Srpski ultranacionalisti čekali su da Rusija uđe u ‘odlučujući sukob sa zapadnim antikristom, da porazi bezbožnu Europu i SAD i uspostavi drugačiji svjetski poredak‘. Povjerovali su u Putina kao mesiju i zamišljaju ga kao nadograđenu verziju Slobodana Miloševića: vladara moćnog carstva s nuklearnim arsenalom na raspolaganju.

Kada je Rusija napala Ukrajinu, Putinovi sljedbenici mislili su da je došao njihov čas; to je bio početak velikog preokreta u kojem će stari poredak biti srušen i iz njegovih ruševina nastati svijet u kojem suverenitet, granice i međunarodni ugovori nisu bili važni. Umjesto međunarodnog prava i ostalih zapadnjačkih sitnica, zavladao bi zakon džungle, kako autoritarna tradicija nalaže. Države poput Srbije, kako oni vjeruju omiljene od strane vladara ustoličenog u Kremlju, stekle bi pravo da dovrše ono što su započele prije tri desetljeća

Hvaljenje ruske zločinačke agresije na suverenu zemlju neupućenima može izgledati čudno. Ali, kako kaže mi koji živimo u srcu tame, zemlje čiji su heroji Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić i Ratko Mladić, ne očekujemo ništa bolje.

Oni koji još uvijek vjeruju u teorije zavjere o masakru na sarajevskim Markalama 1994. godine da je namješten i da su raskomadani leševi zapravo lutke, lako će povjerovati sličnoj propagandi o masakru civila u Buči. Ako se medijske hijene mogu rugati žrtvama genocida u Srebrenici u udarnom TV terminu, zašto bi žalile za žrtvama Putinovih zločina? Kako je veliki srpski pisac i mislilac Radomir Konstantinović rekao 1991. godine: “Živimo u svijetu (ako je ovo život) u kojem čudovišno postaje prirodno, a prirodno čudovišno.” Njegova dijagnoza Srbije, nažalost, nije ništa izgubila na točnosti.

Ovaj je članak dio serije, objavljene u suradnji s Voxeuropom, koja prikazuje perspektive invazije na Ukrajinu iz bivšeg sovjetskog bloka i susjednih zemalja. Budite informirani. Sudjelujte. Razgovarajte. Pružite podršku. Vjerujemo da su vijesti javno dobro; podrška naših čitatelja osigurat će da naš blog ostane neovisan. Izvještavanje o Europi i svijetu s europskog stajališta, poticanje razmjene ideja preko granica i jezika: ovo je golemi novinarski zadatak koji smo preuzeli i građanska avantura na koju vas pozivamo. Stvorimo mjerilo za europske medije civilnog društva i građana.

Poveznice na objavljene članke:

Glas Amerike, 2. mart 2022., https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

European Western Balkans https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2022/03/23/rooting-for-russia-then-blaming-the-west-evolution-of-serbian-tabloids-reporting-on-the-war-in-ukraine/

Glas Amerike, 2. mart 2022., https://www.glasamerike.net/a/srbija-lazne-vesti-ukrajina-rusija-rat-pandemija/6466774.html

Istinomer, 11. mart 2022, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

Istinomer, https://www.istinomer.rs/facebook-provere/razvijanje-biohemijskog-oruzja-za-unistenje-rusa-reciklirana-teorija-zavere/

The most potent weapon - Geoengineering

The most potent weapon against the EU may be the weather. How the next phase of Moscow's energy war plays out in large part depends on something no politician or scientists can control — the weather. Hmm... It's time to prepare for technologies that manipulate the climate.

Sticks of silver iodide are fired into the atmosphere to produce precipitation. Tiny particles are suspended in the stratosphere to block the sun's rays. Massive filters and underground pumps can siphon carbon from the air.

Geoengineering, the intentional manipulation of the climate, is quickly emerging as a tool to address global warming. Even though these technologies could have world-altering consequences, there is no international agreement or enforcement mechanism that directly addresses geoengineering. Without regulation, it would only take one country—watching its crops shrivel or its water run dry—taking a chance to set a global climate experiment in motion, potentially leading to conflict. And then, there’s the Russian Federation. Geoengineering ideas have a long history in Russia—and now, they appear to be moving to the next scientific level.

Although so far it has received little or no attention, the journal Russian Meteorology and Hydrology recently published a new kind of geoengineering study whose lead author is the journal’s editor, the prominent Russian scientist Yuri A. Izrael. Known for his opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, his skepticism of human-caused global warming, and his enthusiasm for geoengineering, Izrael also happens to be a top scientific adviser to Vladimir Putin. And now, his paper reports on what is probably the very first geoengineering field trial. Izrael and his team of scientists mounted aerosol generators on a helicopter and a car chassis and proceeded to blast out particles at ground level and at heights of up to 200 meters. Then they attempted to measure just how much sunlight reaching the earth was reduced due to the aerosol plume.

This small-scale intervention was effective, the Russian scientists say. And in an accompanying article on geoengineering alternatives, Izrael and colleagues note that “Already in the near future, the technological possibilities of a full-scale use of [aerosol-based geoengineering] will be studied.”

Up until now, scientists have largely studied the possibilities of geoengineering in relatively unthreatening computer models—not out in nature itself. They’ve just run a series of simulations to try to assess likely impacts. In this context, the apparent trajectory of Russian research sounds like something quite new. And it may prompt increasing calls for regulation of geoengineering interventions, even at the small-scale research level where environmental consequences would be relatively minimal.

 The time to establish international agreements on geoengineering is now, while the risks are still theoretical. In particular, any further devastating climate impacts, particularly to vulnerable low-lying developing countries, may draw new calls for geoengineering research or interventions. And given the current state of deliberations in Copenhagen, that’s the scariest thing of all. 

More info: https://map.geoengineeringmonitor.org/

Geoengineering is the deliberate large-scale intervention in the Earth’s natural systems to counteract climate change.

There is a wide range of proposed geoengineering techniques. Generally, these can be grouped into two categories:

Solar Radiation Management (SRM) or Solar Geoengineering

SRM techniques aim to reflect a small proportion of the Sun’s energy back into space, counteracting the temperature rise caused by increased levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere which absorb energy and raise temperatures. Some proposed techniques include:

Albedo enhancement. Increasing the reflectiveness of clouds or the land surface so that more of the Sun’s heat is reflected back into space.

Space reflectors. Blocking a small proportion of sunlight before it reaches the Earth.

Stratospheric aerosols. Introducing small, reflective particles into the upper atmosphere to reflect some sunlight before it reaches the surface of the Earth.

Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR)  or Carbon Geoengineering

GGR techniques aim to remove carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases from the atmosphere, directly countering the increased greenhouse effect and ocean acidification. These techniques would have to be implemented on a global scale to have a significant impact on greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere.  Some proposed techniques include:

Afforestation.  Engaging in a global-scale tree planting effort.

Biochar.  'Charring' biomass and burying it so that its carbon is locked up in the soil.

Bio-energy with carbon capture and sequestration.  Growing biomass, burning it to create energy, and capturing and sequestering the carbon dioxide created in the process.

Ambient Air Capture.  Building large machines that can remove carbon dioxide directly from ambient air and store it elsewhere.

Ocean Fertilisation.  Adding nutrients to the ocean in selected locations increases primary production which draws down carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

Enhanced Weathering.  Exposing large quantities of minerals that will react with carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and storing the resulting compound in the ocean or soil.

Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement.  Grinding up, dispersing, and dissolving rocks such as limestone, silicates, or calcium hydroxide in the ocean increases its ability to store carbon and directly ameliorate ocean acidification.

EU IS CLOSER TO A FACIAL RECOGNITION BAN!

 

EU lawmakers held their first political debate on the AI Act on Wednesday (5 October) as the discussion moved to more sensitive topics like the highly debated issue of biometric recognition. The AI Act is a landmark EU legislation intended to regulate Artificial Intelligence introducing a series of obligations proportional to the potential harm of the technologies’ applications. So far, the co-rapporteurs of the European Parliament, the social democrat Brando Benifei and the liberal Dragoș Tudorache have limited the discussion to the more technical aspects, hoping to build momentum before addressing the more political hurdles. This approach was not without its successes since the file progressed in several parts. In the meeting, the MEPs formally agreed on the first two batches of compromises on administrative procedures, conformity assessment, standards, and certificates. Some significant parts of the third batch on obligations for high-risk systems were also endorsed.

However, most of the political meeting in Strasbourg on Wednesday was dedicated to highly sensitive topics such as the scope of the AI regulation and the restraints to the use of biometric recognition, a much-debated technology that allows identifying a person by its face or other personal traits. As expected, the most passionate part of the debate was on biometric recognition systems. Ahead of the meeting, the co-rapporteur shared an agenda, including a proposed rewording of the article on prohibited practices. In the initial draft, the European Commission proposed banning subliminal techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, social scoring, and real-time biometric identification systems. However, the latter prohibition had some remarkable exceptions, when it came to identifying kidnapping victims, preventing imminent threats such as terrorist attacks, and flagging criminal suspects.

Progressive lawmakers and civil society organizations have harshly criticized this approach, contending that these exceptions could open the door to more generalized surveillance. The leading MEPs have now put that in black and white while leaving the other prohibited practices untouched.

The article now forbids “placing or making available on the market, the putting into service or use of remote biometric identification systems that are or may be used in publicly or privately accessible spaces, both offline and online.” Notably, the text removes the reference to real-time, extending the ban to ex-post identification, affecting some of the most controversial cases, such as face-scraping company Clearview AI. Another significant extension is to private spaces, clarifying that the ban also applies to the online sphere. The complete ban would go along with a resolution adopted in October last year when the center-right European People’s Party (EPP) was largely isolated in its calls for giving law enforcement some leeway in using these tools.

The scope of the AI rulebook is another sensitive topic. The co-rapporteurs proposed an exemption for public authorities in third countries and international organizations that use the AI in the context of international cooperation or judicial cooperation agreements and if they are covered by a data adequacy decision or an agreement on fundamental rights. This compromise falls somewhere in the middle between progressive MEPs asking for stricter fundamental rights safeguards – which are not necessarily covered by data adequacy decisions – and center-right lawmakers favoring a broader exemption for third countries.

Moreover, the leading MEPs suggested that the regulation would not affect the EU’s data protection rules, including those related to law enforcement, the European regime on consumer protection and product safety, national labor law, and purely research and development (R&D) activities. The R&D exemption was particularly discussed. According to one official, the issue here is more on the wording, as no one wants to provide a loophole. For a second parliamentary official, on the issue of scope, there is a general recognition that every group needs to renounce something. Therefore, the text needs to be looked at comprehensively. The initial Commission’s draft included an obligation for the providers of AI systems most likely to cause harm to be registered in an EU database. The compromise amendments proposed extending that obligation to users that are public authorities and to anyone who makes a substantial modification to the system. The EPP and Greens disagree with such wording, but each group for opposite reasons.

Meanwhile, in Russia, The Moscow city government's IT department plans to build a unified system for processing footage from security cameras throughout Russia by mid-December. The project will reportedly allow authorities to use Moscow's facial recognition technology to identify people caught on tape in every region of the country.

The Moscow Department of Information Technologies (DIT) plans to deploy a platform for the centralized collection and analysis of video data from surveillance cameras nationwide. It is expected that this will increase the effectiveness of search activities and help improve the security situation in general. As informed Kommersant newspaper, information about the project is contained in the state contract published by DIT on the RTS-Tender site. The idea is to modernize the unified data storage center (ECSD) of the capital’s mayor’s office, on the basis of which the face recognition system operates. The amount of the contract is 43.3 million rubles, and the deadline for completing the work is until December 16 of the current year. But, as experts note, such a small amount is likely to be allocated only for design work, and the modernization itself can be much more expensive.

After the expansion of capacities, the metropolitan data center will be able to receive and process data from video surveillance cameras installed throughout Russia. Centralization is expected to make facial recognition services more sustainable. In addition, the initiative will help solve the problem of lack of funds and capacities in the regions. The fact is that now not all subjects of the Russian Federation have the necessary financial and hardware resources to create a platform for storing and analyzing video materials. At the same time, the Moscow DIT is able to solve this problem on a national scale.

EU sanctions against Russia explained

The EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia in response to the military aggression against Ukraine. Find out what this means in practice.

Since Russia’s recognition of the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in Ukraine on 21 February 2022 and the unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the EU has imposed a series of new sanctions against Russia. 

They add to existing measures imposed on Russia since 2014 following the annexation of Crimea and the non-implementation of the Minsk agreements.

Sanctions include targeted restrictive measures (individual sanctions), economic sanctions, and diplomatic measures.

The aim of the economic sanctions is to impose severe consequences on Russia for its actions and to thwart the Russian ability to continue the aggression effectively.

The individual sanctions target people responsible for supporting, financing, or implementing actions that undermine the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence of Ukraine or who benefit from these actions.

The EU has also adopted sanctions against Belarus in response to its involvement in the invasion of Ukraine.

The sanctions do not block the export and transactions related to food and agricultural products.

EU leaders stressed at the European Council on 23-24 June 2022 that Russia is solely responsible for the global food crisis and that EU sanctions do not target food and agricultural products. Food security and affordability are key priorities for the EU and its member states.

EU sanctions do not impact food security and cover only bilateral trade between the EU and Russia – not international trade.​

EU sanctions explicitly exclude food supplies and fertilizers: there are no sanctions on Russian exports of food to global markets. Anyone can operate, buy, transport, and ensure food and fertilizers coming out of Russia.

The restrictions on the import of certain potash fertilizers under the EU sanctions only apply to products imported to the EU and do not concern exports of them to Ukraine from the EU or from Russia.

The EU has also made exceptions within its sanctions: although European airspace is not open to Russian aircraft, EU member states can authorize overflight of their airspace by Russian aircraft if that is required for humanitarian purposes. EU member states are also authorized to grant Russian-flagged vessels access to EU ports and Russian road carriers entry to the EU for importing or transporting agricultural products, including fertilizers and wheat, that are not subject to restrictions.

In total, also taking into account earlier individual sanctions imposed after the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the EU has sanctioned 108 entities and 1206 individuals. The list includes:

Russia’s President, Vladimir Putin

Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov

pro-Russian former President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych

oligarchs linked to the Kremlin, such as Roman Abramovich

351 members of the Russian State Duma (the lower house of parliament) who voted in favor of the recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk on 15 February 2022

members of the National Security Council

local politicians such as the mayor of Moscow 

high-ranking officials and military personnel

prominent businesspeople (i.e. people active in the Russian steel industry and others who provide financial services, military products, and technology to the Russian state)

propagandists and disinformation actors

individuals responsible for the atrocities committed in Bucha and Mariupol

individuals involved in the recruitment of Syrian mercenaries to fight in Ukraine 

selected family members of some of the abovementioned individuals

Sanctions on individuals consist of travel bans and asset freezes. Travel bans prevent listed individuals from entering or transiting through EU territory, by either land, air, or sea.

Asset freezes mean that all accounts belonging to the listed persons and entities in EU banks are frozen. It is also prohibited to make any funds or assets directly or indirectly available to them.

This ensures that their money can no longer be used to support the Russian regime nor can they try to find a safe haven in the EU.

As part of the economic sanctions, the EU has imposed a number of import and export restrictions on Russia. This means that European entities cannot sell certain products to Russia (export restrictions) and that Russian entities are not allowed to sell certain products to the EU (import restrictions).

The list of banned products is designed to maximize the negative impact of the sanctions on the Russian economy while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens. The export and import restrictions exclude products primarily intended for consumption and products related to health, pharma, food, and agriculture, in order not to harm the Russian population.

The bans are implemented by the EU’s customs authorities.

Moreover, the EU, in collaboration with other like-minded partners, has adopted a statement reserving the right to stop treating Russia as the most favored nation within the WTO framework. The EU has decided to act on this not through an increase in import tariffs, but through restrictive measures that include bans on the import or export of certain goods. The EU and its partners have also suspended any work related to the accession of Belarus to the WTO.

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

cutting-edge technology (e.g. quantum computers and advanced semiconductors, high-end electronics and software)

certain types of machinery and transportation equipment

specific goods and technology needed for oil refining

energy industry equipment, technology, and services

aviation and space industry goods and technology (e.g. aircraft, spare parts or any kind of equipment for planes and helicopters, jet fuel)

maritime navigation goods and radio communication technology

a number of dual-use goods (goods that could be used for both civil and military purposes), such as drones and software for drones or encryption devices

luxury goods (e.g. luxury cars, watches, jewelry)

The list of sanctioned products includes among others:

crude oil and refined petroleum products, with limited exceptions (with phase-out of 6 to 8 months)

coal and other solid fossil fuels (as there is a wind-down period for existing contracts, this sanction will apply as from August 2022)

gold, including jewelry

steel and iron

wood, cement, and certain fertilizers

seafood and liquor (e.g. caviar, vodka)

In June 2022, the Council adopted the sixth package of sanctions that, among others, prohibits the purchase, import, or transfer of crude oil and certain petroleum products from Russia to the EU. The restrictions will apply gradually: within six months for crude oil and within eight months for other refined petroleum products.

A temporary exception is foreseen for imports of crude oil by pipeline into those EU member states that, due to their geographic situation, suffer from a specific dependence on Russian supplies and have no viable alternative options.

Moreover, Bulgaria and Croatia specifically will benefit from temporary derogations concerning the import of Russian seaborne crude oil and vacuum gas oil respectively.

As the majority of the Russian oil delivered to the EU is seaborne, these restrictions will cover nearly 90% of Russian oil imports to Europe by the end of the year. This will significantly reduce Russia’s trade profits.

The EU has prohibited Russian and Belarusian road transport operators from entering the EU, including for goods in transit.

This sanction aims to restrict the Russian industry’s capacity to acquire key goods and to disrupt road trade both to and from Russia. However, EU countries can grant derogations for:

the transport of energy

the transport of pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid purposes

transport related to the functioning of diplomatic and consular representations of the EU and its countries in Russia, or of international organizations in Russia which enjoy immunities in accordance with international law

the transfer or export to Russia of cultural goods on loan in the context of formal cultural cooperation with Russia

The ban does not affect mail services and goods in transit between Kaliningrad Oblast and Russia.

In February 2022, the EU refused access to EU airports for Russian carriers of all kinds and banned them from overflying EU airspace. This means that airplanes registered in Russia or elsewhere and leased or rented to a Russian citizen or entity cannot land at any EU airports and cannot fly over EU countries. Private aircraft, e.g. private business jets, are included in the ban.

In addition, the EU banned the export to Russia of goods and technology in the aviation and space industry.

Insurance services, maintenance services, and technical assistance related to these goods and technology are also prohibited. The United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom imposed similar restrictions.

This means that Russian airlines cannot buy any aircraft, spare parts, or equipment for their fleet and cannot perform the necessary repairs or technical inspections. As three-quarters of Russia’s current commercial air fleet were produced in the EU, the US, or Canada, over time the ban is likely to result in the grounding of a significant proportion of the Russian civil aviation fleet, even for domestic flights.

The EU has closed its ports to Russia's entire merchant fleet of over 2 800 vessels. However, the measure does not affect vessels carrying:

energy

pharmaceutical, medical, agricultural, and food products

humanitarian aid

nuclear fuel and other goods necessary for the functioning of civil nuclear capabilities

coal (until 10 August 2022, after which imports of coal into the EU will be banned)

The measure also does not affect vessels in need of assistance seeking a place of refuge, or vessels making an emergency port call for reasons of maritime safety or saving life at sea.

The ban will also apply to vessels that try to evade the sanctions by changing their Russian flag or registration to that of another state. Port authorities can identify an attempt to reflag or change registration by checking a vessel’s IMO number (the unique identification number assigned on behalf of the International Maritime Organization).

The ban prevents ten Russian and four Belarusian banks from making or receiving international payments using SWIFT.

SWIFT is a messaging service that substantially facilitates information exchange between banks and other financial institutions. SWIFT connects more than 11 000 entities worldwide.

As a result, these banks can neither get foreign currency (as a transfer of foreign currencies between two banks is generally processed as a transfer abroad involving a foreign intermediary bank) nor transfer assets abroad. This has negative consequences for the Russian and Belarusian economies.

Technically, banks could carry out international transactions without SWIFT, but it is expensive, complex, and requires mutual trust between financial institutions. It brings payments back to the times when telephone and fax were used to confirm each transaction.

The European Union has prohibited all transactions with the National Central Bank of Russia related to the management of the Russian Central Bank’s reserves and assets. As a result of the central bank asset freeze, the central bank can no longer access the assets it has stored in central banks and private institutions in the EU.

In February 2022, Russia’s international reserves accounted for $643 billion (€579 billion). Among other purposes, having reserves in foreign currencies helps keep the exchange rate of a country’s own currency stable.

Due to the ban on transactions from the EU and other countries, it is estimated that more than half of Russian reserves are frozen. The ban was also imposed by other countries (such as the US, Canada, and the UK) which also store a share of Russia’s foreign reserves.

Consequently, Russia cannot use this cushion of foreign assets to provide funds to its banks and thus limit the effects of other sanctions. Even the gold reserves stored in Russia now appear to be more difficult to sell due to international sanctions affecting Russian entities.

The EU has also prohibited the sale, supply, transfer, and export of euro-denominated banknotes to Russia. The aim is to limit access to cash in euros by the Russian government, its Central Bank, and natural or legal persons in Russia with a view to preventing the circumvention of sanctions.

Similar sanctions apply to Belarus.

The Russian Federation has engaged in a systematic, international campaign of disinformation, information manipulation, and distortion of facts in order to enhance its strategy of destabilizing both its neighboring countries and the EU and its member states.

To counteract this, the EU has suspended the broadcasting activities in the EU of five Russian state-owned outlets:

Sputnik

Russia Today

Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta

Rossiya 24/Russia 24

TV Centre International

Russia uses all these state-owned outlets to intentionally spread propaganda and conduct disinformation campaigns, including about its military aggression against Ukraine.

The restrictions against Sputnik and Russia Today (together with their subsidiaries, such as RT English, RT Germany, RT France, and RT Spanish) have been in place since 2 March 2022. The restrictions on the other three entities have been in place as of 4 June 2022.

They cover all means of transmission and distribution in or directed at the EU member states, including cable, satellite, Internet Protocol TV, platforms, websites, and apps.

In line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, these measures will not prevent those media outlets and their staff from carrying out activities in the EU other than broadcasting, e.g. research and interviews.

Sanctions are more effective if a broad range of international partners is involved. The EU has worked closely over the last few weeks with like-minded partners such as the United States in order to coordinate sanctions.

The EU is working with the World Bank Group, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other international partners to prevent Russia from obtaining financing from such institutions.

To coordinate this international effort, the newly formed Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force allow the EU to cooperate with the G7 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States – as well as with Australia, to ensure sanctions are implemented.

Although the EU works closely with many partners, each of these non-EU countries decides unilaterally which sanctions it will impose.

All EU sanctions are fully compliant with obligations under international law, whilst respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Once political agreement is reached among EU member states, the necessary legal acts are prepared by the European External Action Service and/or the European Commission and submitted to the Council for adoption.

Council regulations and decisions, as legal acts of general application, are binding on any person or entity under EU jurisdiction. This means any person or entity within the EU, any EU national in any location, and all companies and organizations incorporated under the law of an EU member state.

Global Gateway – the moment of truth.

 

The Global Gateway is the EU’s new connectivity strategy that aims to create smart, sustainable, and secure links with countries around the world in the thematic areas of digital, energy, and transport. It also aims to strengthen health and education systems across the world. The paper argues that the Global Gateway strategy has the seeds of something new, but that it will need to overcome a number of challenges to be successful.

The Global Gateway strategy presents a clear European offer based on democratic values, equal partnerships, environmental sustainability, safe and secure infrastructure, and integrates the private sector. The EU wants to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative and other regional and global players and to re-establish the EU’s standing, notably in Africa where the EU promised €150 billion of the €300 billion pledged under the Global Gateway investments.

It will be essential for member states to fully buy into the Global Gateway brand, bringing both their political and financial offer to the table. It will take time, patience, and genuine impact to develop the Global Gateway into a successful brand. Overcoming reputational issues, particularly in Africa, will require showing that this is genuinely a new approach. The Global Gateway will also require a change in the way development, foreign and economic policy areas work together, combining geopolitical steering and an understanding of private sector needs. Finally, there will be no Global Gateway unless the EU and its member states manage to scale up private sector investment.

The Global Gateway, the European Union’s 300 billion euro investment package, is committed to this, and its aim is to help restore the world order based on international and economic rules.

In the program that started almost a year ago, the approach that Estonia had set on its banner much earlier took shape: the idea of ​​trusted connectivity.

That Russia has waged war unjustifiably and has gravely violated international law has only made it all the more urgent that we adopt this approach.

We are replacing Russian fossil fuels with resilient supply chains that enable the transition to a green economy and avoid new dependencies. We want an open, secure, and human-centered digital society that reflects our democratic values ​​and norms. We are in constant contact with partners who want to build a free, prosperous, and sustainable future with us. On our way, we are now faced with a choice: are we willing to pay a premium for trust or not?

Europe’s message is clear: trust may have a price – but this price is worth paying. The value of freedom is priceless.

Actions followed words

The three Baltic states and other Central and Eastern European countries have been aware of Putin’s intentions for years and have warned others that Russia is not a reliable energy partner. Estonia – as well as Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland – began to disconnect from Russian energy long before the Kremlin invaded Ukraine. The mentioned countries have invested in renewable energy, and have developed LNG terminals and energy system connectors. Thanks to the REPowerEU plan, the whole of Europe is now following their example to never again depend on Russian fossil fuels. The current crisis revealed what internal strength the European Union possesses. We acted together, quickly and decisively.

Our sanctions on Russia are crippling the country’s war economy, and Ukraine is making gains on the battlefield.

NATO and the Transatlantic Security Alliance are stronger than ever. However, the war is far from over. To ensure Ukraine’s victory, the EU and its allies must use their influence to shift the geopolitical and economic order in the direction of openness, cooperation, and freedom, to a situation where everyone abides by the rules that reflect these values. And for this, the Global Gateway initiative, which embodies the idea of ​​reliable connectivity, is the right tool.

Towards trusted partnerships

The Global Gateway is Europe’s promise to offer positive, value-based cooperation opportunities to our neighbors and global partners. While autocracies think in terms of spheres of influence and instead of eliminating them, they want to deepen unhealthy dependency relationships, we want to create partnerships based on common values ​​and a common vision for the future. We want to build the digital and environmentally friendly infrastructure of the future economy, we want to connect our partners – including our eastern neighbors – with Europe, and Europe with the colorful and dynamic southern part of the world.

Global Gateway is already delivering tangible results.

For example, the EU finances new economic corridors and energy industry infrastructure with its help, so that the countries of the Western Balkans are more closely connected to the Union and come closer to realizing their dreams of European integration. By investing in renewable energy, green hydrogen, and raw materials value chains, we are building mutually beneficial relationships with countries such as Namibia and Chile. This benefits both their sustainable growth and our energy security. A good example is the creation of digital infrastructures, such as the new undersea optical cable under the Black Sea, with which we diversify Internet access in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Through the Global Gateway, we are also supporting the establishment of plants producing mRNA vaccines in Rwanda, Senegal, and soon in Latin America, to advance global health by transferring advanced technologies and improving regional resilience.

It is important to act unitedly against the increasing confidence and aggression of autocratic regimes. That is why the Global Gateway connects Europe’s closest partners, as well as other initiatives promoting reliable connectivity, such as the global infrastructure and investment partnership of the G7. In this way, we can not only strengthen the impact of our investments but also use our knowledge and standardization power more effectively. Together, we are able to shape the new era of globalization, an era in which the resilience of the economy is important, not just economic efficiency, and which, in addition to serving our well-being, is also in line with our values.

Collaboration platform

We have reached a decisive moment – the moment of truth.

We must continue to meet the challenges and build a strong coalition for progress against historical revisionism. To facilitate cooperation, Estonia created the “Team Europe” partnership portal, where the European Union and its member states can contact their partners within the framework of the Global Gateway initiative. This year’s Tallinn Digital Summit is also a call to democratic countries to put into practice the vision of reliable connectivity together, to protect freedom and democracy, and to demonstrate our long-term commitment – to Ukraine, to peace, to open and fair international in addition to the future of our order.

Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, and Kaja Kallas, Prime Minister of Estonia.

Eighth package of sanctions

This package introduces new EU import bans worth €7 billion to curb Russia's revenues, as well as export restrictions, which will further deprive the Kremlin's military and industrial complex of key components and technologies and Russia's economy of European services and expertise. The sanctions also deprive the Russian army and its suppliers from further specific goods and equipment needed to wage its war on Ukrainian territory. The package also lays the basis for the required legal framework to implement the oil price cap envisaged by the G7.

6 October 2022Brussels

The Commission welcomes the Council's adoption of an eighth package of hard-hitting sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. This package – which has been closely coordinated with our international partners – responds to Russia's continued escalation and illegal war against Ukraine, including by illegally annexing Ukrainian territory based on sham “referenda”, mobilising additional troops, and issuing open nuclear threats.

Specifically, this package contains the following elements:

Additional listings

Additional individuals and entities have been sanctioned. This targets those involved in Russia's occupation, illegal annexation, and sham “referenda” in the occupied territories/oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. It also includes individuals and entities working in the defence sector, such as high-ranking and military officials, as well as companies supporting the Russian armed forces. The EU also continues to target actors who spread disinformation about the war. 

EU restrictive measure target key decision makers, oligarchs, senior military officials and propagandists, responsible for undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Extension of restrictions to the oblasts of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia

The geographical scope of the restrictive measures in response to the recognition of the non-government controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine and the ordering of Russian armed forces into those areas has been extended to cover all the non-government controlled areas of Ukraine in the oblasts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

New export restrictions

Additional export restrictions have been introduced which aim to reduce Russia's access to military, industrial and technological items, as well as its ability to develop its defence and security sector.

This includes the banning of the export of coal including coking coal (which is used in Russian industrial plants), specific electronic components (found in Russian weapons), technical items used in the aviation sector, as well as certain chemicals.

A prohibition on exporting small arms and other goods under the anti-torture Regulation has been added.

New import restrictions

Almost €7 billion worth of additional import restrictions have been agreed.

It includes, for example, a ban on the import of Russian finished and semi-finished steel products (subject to a transition period for some semi-finished), machinery and appliances, plastics, vehicles, textiles, footwear, leather, ceramics, certain chemical products, and non-gold jewellery.

Implementing the G7 oil price cap

Today's package marks the beginning of the implementation within the EU of the G7 agreement on Russian oil exports. While the EU's ban on importing Russian seaborne crude oil fully remains, the price cap, once implemented, would allow European operators to undertake and support the transport of Russian oil to third countries, provided its price remains under a pre-set “cap”. This will help to further reduce Russia's revenues, while keeping global energy markets stable through continued supplies. It will thus also help address inflation and keep energy costs stable at a time when high costs – particularly elevated fuel prices – are a great concern to all Europeans.

This measure is being closely coordinated with G7 partners. It would take effect after 5 December 2022 for crude and 5 February 2023 for refined petroleum products, after a further decision by the Council.

Restrictions on State-owned enterprises

Today's package bans EU nationals from holding posts in the governing bodies of certain state-owned enterprises.

It also bans all transactions with the Russian Maritime Register, adding it to the list of state-owned enterprises which are subject to a transaction ban.  

Financial, IT consultancy and other business services

The existing prohibitions on crypto assets have been tightened by banning all crypto-asset wallets, accounts, or custody services, irrespective of the amount of the wallet (previously up to €10,000 was allowed).

The package widens the scope of services that can no longer be provided to the government of Russia or legal persons established in Russia: these now include IT consultancy, legal advisory, architecture and engineering services. These are significant as they will potentially weaken Russia's industrial capacity because it is highly dependent on importing these services.

Deterring sanctions circumvention

The EU has introduced a new listing criterion, which will allow it to sanction persons who facilitate the infringements of the prohibition against circumvention of sanctions.

More Information

The EU's sanctions against Russia are proving effective. They are damaging Russia's ability to manufacture new weapons and repair existing ones, as well as hinder its transport of material.

The geopolitical, economic, and financial implications of Russia's continued aggression are clear, as the war has disrupted global commodities markets, especially for agrifood products and energy. The EU continues to ensure that its sanctions do not impact energy and agrifood exports from Russia to third countries.

As guardian of the EU Treaties, the European Commission monitors the enforcement of EU sanctions across the EU.

The EU stands united in its solidarity with Ukraine, and will continue to support Ukraine and its people together with its international partners, including through additional political, financial, and humanitarian support.

For More Information

European Commission website on EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus

European Commission website on Ukraine

Q&A on restrictive measures (which will be availble shortly)

Ps. 

Ekonomske sankcije su komercijalne i financijske kazne koje jedna ili više zemalja primjenjuje protiv ciljane samoupravne države, skupine ili pojedinca. Ekonomske sankcije nisu nužno nametnute zbog ekonomskih okolnosti – mogu se nametnuti i za niz političkih, vojnih i društvenih pitanja.