Cuba is actively pursuing renewable energy as a solution to its longstanding energy crisis, driven by unreliable fossil fuel imports, aging infrastructure, and frequent blackouts. As of 2025, renewables account for only about 3-5% of the country's electricity generation, far below the government's ambitious targets.
The focus is primarily on solar power, with growing interest in wind, biomass, and hydropower, supported by international partnerships amid economic challenges like U.S. sanctions.
Cuba is facing an unprecedented economic and social crisis, marked by low wages, power outages, shortages of essential medicines, and a massive exodus of its population. The situation impacts key sectors while the regime halts necessary changes. Cuba is an exhausted country, with a collapsed economy and a population that is fleeing. It needs a profound and urgent change.
In 2025, a multitude of internal and external factors will have aligned, bringing the 66-year-old Cuban communist regime to its deepest crisis ever. Since its establishment in 1959, the Cuban revolutionary regime has endured several moments of profound crisis, which have periodically tested its survivability. Against all odds, it survived its vulnerable first three years (including the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and US trade embargo); the socioeconomic challenges surrounding the chaotic Mariel Boatlift in 1980; the deep political and economic debacle sparked by the withdrawal of Soviet economic and military support at the end of the Cold War (1991-); the ensuing so-called Special Period with concomitant social unrest in 1993-94; and Fidel Castro’s death in 2016. More recently, Cuba’s communist government managed to survive unprecedented mass street protests in July 2021. As long as the political system continues to obstruct reforms, the island will keep heading towards an inevitable disaster.
Several interwoven factors have brought Cuba to this point. Some are old, structural problems that have been exacerbated such as food and fuel scarcities. Others are new, such as the second Trump administration’s multifaceted strategy to push the communist regime into extinction. According to a recent report by the international Food Monitor Program, 25 percent of Cubans admit to going to bed hungry; malnutrition diseases have skyrocketed. The survey also found that two-thirds of the population blame the government for worsening food shortages. According to the Program, Cuba—once the wealthiest and best-fed Caribbean nation—accounts for 5 percent of the population but 40 percent of the region’s food insecurity cases.
Cuba imports 70 per cent of its food, ironically, most of it from the United States. It simply does not have funds nor credit to purchase more food. Neither does it have a functional system of transporting, refrigerating, or distributing foodstuffs. While state authorities blame the US embargo—which since 2000 exempts food and medicines—only 8 percent of Cubans see the embargo as the main culprit. It does not help that Cuban leaders President Díaz-Canel, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, National Assembly President Esteban Lazo, and other high ranking Party and Armed Forces members parade themselves sporting prominent beer bellies while the average Cuban becomes increasingly emaciated.
If food and medicine shortages are severe, it is worse with fuel, almost all of it also imported from abroad, largely oil from Venezuela, Russia, and Mexico. Cuba’s fuel crisis intensified in 2024 stalling tractors, trucks, buses, and motor engines, large and small. I recently saw a video—not AI generated—of an ox pulling a bus. Heaps of trash and debris have accumulated in streets for months because there is no fuel to run trash collecting trucks. The island’s decrepit power plants, moreover, are devastated as evidenced by routine breakdowns and the state’s inability to repair most of them. Back in 2022, the desperate regime brought to Cuba a fleet of floating powerplants; in recent months, the last of these vessels has left Cuba because of the government’s inability to pay for its services. Eighty percent of Cuba’s electricity is generated from oil. Oil scarcity has led to daily and multi-day, island-wide blackouts. There are instances of hospitals without power whose gas or diesel generators cannot be operated because there is no fuel. Lack of fuel has also impacted the water distribution system. Unbelievably, Cuba is also running out of drinking water.Cuba is currently experiencing an unprecedented economic and social crisis characterized by low wages, power outages, shortages of essential medicines, and a massive exodus of its population. This situation profoundly affects key sectors while the regime continues to resist necessary changes. The country is exhausted, with a collapsed economy and a fleeing population, urgently needing profound change.
By 2025, a combination of internal and external factors will align, bringing the 66-year-old Cuban communist regime to its most significant crisis ever. Since its establishment in 1959, the regime has faced several profound crises that have tested its survival. Against the odds, it managed to endure its vulnerable first three years, which included the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and the imposition of a U.S. trade embargo. It survived socioeconomic challenges during the chaotic Mariel Boatlift in 1980 and the severe political and economic decline that followed the withdrawal of Soviet support at the end of the Cold War in 1991. This was followed by the so-called Special Period, which saw significant social unrest in 1993-94, and the death of Fidel Castro in 2016. More recently, the government withstood unprecedented mass protests in July 2021. However, as long as the political system continues to impede reforms, Cuba will move inexorably toward disaster.
Several interrelated factors have led Cuba to this critical moment. Some are longstanding structural issues, such as food and fuel shortages, while others are new, like the multifaceted strategy of the second Trump administration aimed at pushing the communist regime toward extinction. A recent report from the international Food Monitor Program revealed that 25 percent of Cubans admit to going to bed hungry, with malnutrition-related diseases on the rise. The survey also indicated that two-thirds of the population blames the government for escalating food shortages. Once the wealthiest and best-fed nation in the Caribbean, Cuba now accounts for 5 percent of the population but a staggering 40 percent of the region's food insecurity cases.
Cuba imports 70 percent of its food, much of it ironically from the United States. However, the country lacks the funds and credit to purchase adequate supplies and does not have a functional system for transporting, refrigerating, or distributing food. While state authorities attribute the crisis to the U.S. embargo— which has exempted food and medicines since 2000—only 8 percent of Cubans view it as the primary cause. This is compounded by the visible disparity between the leaders, such as President Díaz-Canel, Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, and National Assembly President Esteban Lazo, who flaunt their wealth and comfort, evidenced by their prominent beer bellies, while the average Cuban becomes increasingly emaciated.
The crisis extends beyond food and medicine; fuel shortages are even more severe. Almost all of Cuba's fuel is imported, primarily from Venezuela, Russia, and Mexico. The fuel crisis intensified in 2024, halting the operation of tractors, trucks, buses, and smaller engines. I recently saw a video—not AI-generated—of an ox pulling a bus. Heaps of trash and debris have accumulated in the streets for months due to the lack of fuel for garbage collection trucks.
Additionally, the island’s aging power plants are deteriorating, with routine breakdowns and the government's inability to repair most of them. Back in 2022, the desperate regime introduced a fleet of floating power plants to Cuba; however, in recent months, the last of these vessels left due to the government’s inability to afford their services. Approximately 80 percent of Cuba’s electricity is generated from oil, so the scarcity of fuel has led to daily and multi-day blackouts across the island. There are even instances of hospitals losing power, where gas or diesel generators cannot be operated due to fuel shortages. As if these crises weren't enough, Cuba is also running out of drinking water.
In sum, there is plenty of evidence that Cuba has lost many of the means that have kept the regime afloat for decades, even if precariously so. The ship’s rusted olive-colored hull is full of holes, and Cuba does not have the wherewithal to plug many of them—one is plugged, and two more open. There is a strong possibility that some leaders will jump ship, and other generals may be forced to walk the plank. There are just not enough emergency boats.
Cuba, particularly Havana, is also experiencing a growing number of incidents involving the collapse of old buildings, some of which have been fatal. Four Habaneros died in July, smashed by the rubble of two buildings. Each of these disasters pushes entire families into Cuba, and particularly Havana, which is seeing an increase in incidents involving the collapse of old buildings, some of which have tragically been fatal. In July, four residents lost their lives when two buildings collapsed, burying them under the rubble. These disasters leave entire families homeless. Even the once-stately Aldama mansion, a nineteenth-century neoclassical palace, appears dilapidated. While Havana crumbles, a new forty-two-story luxury hotel, the Iberostar, stands as a stark contrast to the city's impoverished residents.
Desperate for hard currency, the government has implemented measures that have backfired. It now requires Cubans to pay for cell phones and gasoline in dollars. This move is part of the increasing dollarization of the economy, a reversal from the now-defunct Cuban Convertible Peso. As a result, a new class has emerged: the "Cubanos con Fé" (families abroad), while longtime regime supporters struggle with the diminishing purchasing power of the Cuban peso. Recent restrictions on repatriating profits for foreign investors are likely to lead to a dramatic decline in foreign investments, depriving Cuba of a crucial source of support that has helped it weather previous economic crises.
In summary, there is substantial evidence that Cuba has lost many of the resources necessary to keep the regime afloat, even if precariously. The ship's rusted olive-colored hull is riddled with holes, and Cuba lacks the means to repair them—when one hole is fixed, two more emerge. There is a significant possibility that some leaders will abandon ship, and other generals may be forced to resign. There simply aren’t enough lifeboats to accommodate everyone. homelessness. Even Havana’s most stately mansion, Aldama’s nineteenth-century neoclassical palace, looks dilapidated. While Havana crumbles, the recently opened, forty-two-story high Iberostar luxury hotel rises as the regime’s middle finger to the city’s impoverished dwellers. Desperate for hard currency, the government has instituted measures that have backfired. It now requires Cubans to pay in dollars for cell phones and gasoline. That is part of the increasing dollarization of the economy (going back to the now-defunct Cuba Convertible Peso), and how it has given rise to the class of “Cubanos con Fé” (familia en el exterior) while long-time regime supporters have to struggle because of the puny purchasing power of the Cuban peso. Recent orders prohibiting the repatriation of foreign investors’ profit will most certainly lead to a dramatic drop in foreign investments, depriving Cuba of a source of support that had helped it sustain previous economic crises.
Desperate for hard currency, the government has implemented measures that have backfired. It now requires Cubans to pay for cell phones and gasoline in dollars. This move is part of the increasing dollarization of the economy, a reversal from the now-defunct Cuban Convertible Peso. As a result, a new class has emerged: the "Cubanos con Fé" (families abroad), while longtime regime supporters struggle with the diminishing purchasing power of the Cuban peso. Recent restrictions on repatriating profits for foreign investors are likely to lead to a dramatic decline in foreign investments, depriving Cuba of a crucial source of support that has helped it weather previous economic crises.
In summary, there is substantial evidence that Cuba has lost many of the resources necessary to keep the regime afloat, even if precariously. The ship's rusted olive-colored hull is riddled with holes, and Cuba lacks the means to repair them—when one hole is fixed, two more emerge. There is a significant possibility that some leaders will abandon ship, and other generals may be forced to resign. There simply aren’t enough lifeboats to accommodate everyone. homelessness. Even Havana’s most stately mansion, Aldama’s nineteenth-century neoclassical palace, looks dilapidated. While Havana crumbles, the recently opened, forty-two-story high Iberostar luxury hotel rises as the regime’s middle finger to the city’s impoverished dwellers. Desperate for hard currency, the government has instituted measures that have backfired. It now requires Cubans to pay in dollars for cell phones and gasoline. That is part of the increasing dollarization of the economy (going back to the now-defunct Cuba Convertible Peso), and how it has given rise to the class of “Cubanos con Fé” (familia en el exterior) while long-time regime supporters have to struggle because of the puny purchasing power of the Cuban peso. Recent orders prohibiting the repatriation of foreign investors’ profit will most certainly lead to a dramatic drop in foreign investments, depriving Cuba of a source of support that had helped it sustain previous economic crises.
Cuba's National Electric System has been plagued by issues, including fuel shortages from Venezuela, corrosion in thermal plants, and deferred maintenance, leading to only 34% of thermal capacity operational in early 2025.
This has resulted in electricity meeting just 50-70% of demand, with multiple grid collapses in recent months.
Renewables currently contribute minimally, with solar capacity at around 530 MW installed as of mid-2025, including small parks and rooftop systems.
Biomass from sugarcane and limited wind pilots exist, but large-scale adoption is slow.
Overall, 2025 has seen accelerated solar builds and strategic announcements, but achieving long-term goals will require sustained investment and reforms.
In sum, there is plenty of evidence that Cuba has lost many of the means that have kept the regime afloat for decades, even if precariously so. The ship’s rusted olive-colored hull is full of holes, and Cuba does not have the wherewithal to plug many of them—one is plugged, and two more open. There is a strong possibility that some leaders will jump ship, and other generals may be forced to walk the plank. There are just not enough emergency boats.
