Consequences and Responses to a Closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran: Perspectives of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime passage between Iran and Oman, is a critical artery for global energy trade, through which approximately 20-25% of the world’s oil and significant amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG) pass. For the Gulf countries—Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—unimpeded access through this strait is not only an economic necessity but also a matter of national security and regional stability. The threat of Iran closing the strait, often used as a geopolitical tool in conflicts with the West or regional rivals, raises serious concerns. My post explores the consequences of such a closure for the aforementioned countries and analyzes possible responses to this crisis, considering economic, security, and political implications.
Economic Impact of a Strait Closure
The economies of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE heavily rely on energy exports, making the Strait of Hormuz their lifeline. Iraq, for instance, exports nearly all of its oil (approximately 3.5 million barrels per day) from the Basra port through the strait, funding the majority of its state budget. Kuwait similarly depends on oil exports for about 90% of its revenue, while Qatar dominates the global LNG market, supplying countries like Japan and South Korea. The UAE, although it has an alternative route via a pipeline to the Fujairah port in the Gulf of Oman, can only redirect a limited portion of its exports (about 1.5 million barrels per day). Bahrain, while less dependent on oil than its neighbors, would still feel the effects through its logistics and financial hubs, which are closely tied to regional trade.
A closure of the strait would cause an immediate halt to exports, leading to a sharp decline in revenue for these countries. Global oil prices could surge, potentially exceeding $100 per barrel depending on the duration of the blockade, triggering shocks in world markets. While higher oil prices might theoretically benefit exporting countries, the long-term effects would be negative due to reduced global demand and disruptions in supply chains. Qatar, for example, would face challenges in LNG deliveries, jeopardizing the energy security of its key partners. The UAE, whose emirates like Dubai and Abu Dhabi invest heavily in tourism and trade, could experience a downturn in these sectors due to perceptions of regional insecurity.
Ironically, closing the strait would also harm Iran itself, as it relies on the same passage for its oil exports. This suggests that a complete and prolonged blockade is unlikely, but even temporary disruptions—such as mining or attacks on tankers—would cause significant economic consequences for all involved countries.
Security and Geopolitical Risks
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz would not only be an economic crisis but also a security challenge for Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE. Iran possesses advanced military capabilities to disrupt maritime traffic, including anti-ship missiles, mines, submarines, and fast boats operated by the Revolutionary Guard. Historical examples, such as the attacks on tankers near Fujairah in 2019 or disruptions during the Tanker War in the 1980s, demonstrate that Iran can cause significant disturbances without fully closing the strait.
Bahrain, as the host of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, would be in a particularly vulnerable position. Iran could target U.S. military assets in the country, increasing the risk of conflict escalation. Kuwait, which also hosts U.S. forces, would face similar threats. The UAE and Qatar, while less exposed to direct attacks, would need to balance their alliance commitments to the U.S. with the need to avoid Iranian retaliation. Iraq, given its Shiite population and Iran’s political influence, could face internal unrest if drawn into the conflict.
The geopolitical context further complicates the situation. The UAE and Bahrain, having normalized relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, could become targets of Iranian rhetoric or attacks, especially if tensions between Iran and Israel escalate. Qatar, which maintains diplomatic ties with Iran, might attempt to mediate, but its role would be limited due to its alliance with the U.S. These countries, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), would likely coordinate their security strategies, but internal differences—such as occasional tensions between Qatar and the UAE—could hinder a unified response.
Possible Responses to the Crisis
The response to a closure of the Strait of Hormuz would involve a combination of military, diplomatic, and economic measures, with an emphasis on quickly restoring security and stability.
1. Military Response
The U.S. would likely take the lead in securing the strait. The Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, has the capabilities to clear mines, escort tankers, and neutralize Iranian threats. Historical operations, such as Earnest Will in the 1980s, show that the U.S. can effectively protect maritime traffic, albeit with the risk of escalation. Allies like the United Kingdom and France, part of international maritime coalitions, could provide additional support.
Regional countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, might contribute with logistics and air forces, but their direct engagement would be limited due to fears of Iranian retaliation. Military escalation, however, carries the risk of a broader conflict, including attacks on oil infrastructure in the region, which would further exacerbate the crisis.
2. Diplomatic Response
Diplomatic efforts would focus on de-escalation and pressuring Iran to reopen the strait. The EU, which has a Cooperation Agreement with the GCC, could mediate, as it did in past negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. Qatar, leveraging its ties with both Iran and the West, could play a mediating role, though its influence would be constrained by its U.S. alliance. Countries like India and Japan, dependent on Gulf oil, would exert economic pressure on Iran.
Within Iran, the final decision on closing the strait rests with the Supreme National Security Council, not solely the parliament, which recently supported a proposal for a blockade. This suggests that Iran may be using the threat as a negotiating tool, seeking concessions such as sanctions relief or a reduction in U.S. military presence in the region.
3. Economic Response
In the short term, Gulf countries would attempt to redirect exports through alternative routes, such as the East-West pipeline in Saudi Arabia or the Fujairah port in the UAE. However, these capacities are limited and vulnerable to attacks, for instance, by Yemen’s Houthis, who are aligned with Iran. Global oil-importing countries might turn to other sources, such as Russia or Latin America, but this would require time and increase costs.
In the long term, the crisis could spur investments in economic diversification for these countries. The UAE and Qatar are already investing in tourism, technology, and finance, while Iraq and Kuwait lag behind in this process. A strait closure would underscore the urgency of reducing dependence on oil and gas.
Conclusion
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran would pose an existential threat to Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, triggering economic shocks, security risks, and political tensions. The disruption of oil and gas exports would jeopardize these countries’ revenues, while the threat of Iranian military action would heighten regional instability. However, a complete and prolonged blockade is unlikely due to the harm it would inflict on Iran itself and the strong U.S. military presence in the region.
The response to the crisis would involve swift military action to secure the strait, diplomatic efforts to de-escalate, and economic measures to mitigate the consequences. The GCC countries, in collaboration with international partners like the U.S. and the EU, would play a key role. Nevertheless, the situation remains volatile, and long-term stability requires addressing broader geopolitical tensions in the region, including Iran’s nuclear program and regional rivalries. The Strait of Hormuz remains a symbol of global interconnectedness and vulnerability, where the actions of one country can have far-reaching consequences for the entire world.
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Posljedice i odgovori na zatvaranje Hormuškog tjesnaca od strane Irana: Perspektiva Bahraina, Iraka, Kuvajta, Katara i UAE
Hormuški tjesnac, uski pomorski prolaz između Irana i Omana, ključna je arterija globalne trgovine energentima, kroz koju prolazi oko 20-25% svjetske nafte i značajne količine ukapljenog prirodnog plina (LNG).
Za zemlje Perzijskog zaljeva – Bahrain, Irak, Kuvajt, Katar i Ujedinjene Arapske Emirate (UAE) – nesmetan prolaz kroz ovaj tjesnac nije samo ekonomska potreba, već i pitanje nacionalne sigurnosti i regionalne stabilnosti. Prijetnja zatvaranjem tjesnaca od strane Irana, često korištena kao geopolitički alat u kontekstu sukoba sa Zapadom ili regionalnim rivalima, izaziva ozbiljne zabrinutosti. Ovaj moj post istražuje posljedice takvog zatvaranja za navedene zemlje i analizira moguće odgovore na ovu krizu, uzimajući u obzir ekonomske, sigurnosne i političke implikacije.
Ekonomski utjecaj zatvaranja tjesnaca
Ekonomije Bahraina, Iraka, Kuvajta, Katara i UAE uvelike ovise o izvozu energenata, što čini Hormuški tjesnac njihovom životnom linijom. Irak, na primjer, izvozi gotovo svu svoju naftu (oko 3,5 milijuna barela dnevno) iz luke Basra preko tjesnaca, čime financira veći dio svog državnog proračuna. Kuvajt, slično tome, oslanja se na izvoz nafte za oko 90% svojih prihoda, dok Katar dominira globalnim tržištem LNG-a, opskrbljujući zemlje poput Japana i Južne Koreje. UAE, iako ima alternativnu rutu putem cjevovoda do luke Fujairah u Omanskom zaljevu, može na taj način preusmjeriti samo ograničeni dio svog izvoza (oko 1,5 milijuna barela dnevno). Bahrain, iako manje ovisan o nafti od svojih susjeda, i dalje osjeti posljedice kroz svoje logističke i financijske centre, koji su usko povezani s regionalnom trgovinom.
Zatvaranje tjesnaca izazvalo bi trenutni prekid izvoza, što bi dovelo do naglog pada prihoda za ove zemlje. Globalne cijene nafte mogle bi skočiti, možda čak i iznad 100 dolara po barelu, ovisno o trajanju blokade, što bi izazvalo šokove na svjetskim tržištima. Iako bi više cijene nafte teoretski mogle donijeti korist zemljama izvoznicama, dugoročni učinci bili bi negativni zbog smanjene globalne potražnje i poremećaja u lancima opskrbe.
Katar, na primjer, suočio bi se s problemima u isporuci LNG-a, što bi ugrozilo energetsku sigurnost njegovih ključnih partnera. UAE, čiji emirati poput Dubaija i Abu Dhabija ulažu u turizam i trgovinu, mogao bi doživjeti pad u tim sektorima zbog percepcije regionalne nesigurnosti.
Ironično, zatvaranje tjesnaca štetilo bi i samom Iranu, koji također izvozi naftu kroz ovaj prolaz. To sugerira da bi potpuna i dugotrajna blokada bila malo vjerojatna, ali čak i privremeno ometanje – poput miniranja ili napada na tankere – izazvalo bi značajne ekonomske posljedice za sve uključene zemlje.
Sigurnosni i geopolitički rizici
Zatvaranje Hormuškog tjesnaca ne bi bilo samo ekonomska kriza, već i sigurnosni izazov za Bahrain, Irak, Kuvajt, Katar i UAE. Iran ima razvijene vojne kapacitete za ometanje pomorskog prometa, uključujući protubrodska projektila, mine, podmornice i brze čamce Revolucionarne garde. Povijesni primjeri, poput napada na tankere kod Fujairaha 2019. ili ometanja prometa tijekom Tankerskog rata 1980-ih, pokazuju da Iran može izazvati značajne poremećaje bez potpunog zatvaranja tjesnaca.
Bahrain, kao domaćin Pete flote SAD-a, bio bi u posebno ranjivom položaju. Iran bi mogao ciljati američke vojne ciljeve u zemlji, što bi povećalo rizik od eskalacije sukoba. Kuvajt, koji također ugošćuje američke snage, suočio bi se s sličnim prijetnjama. UAE i Katar, iako manje izloženi izravnim napadima, morali bi balansirati između svojih savezničkih obveza prema SAD-u i potrebe za izbjegavanjem iranske odmazde. Irak, s obzirom na svoje šijitsko stanovništvo i politički utjecaj Irana, mogao bi se suočiti s unutarnjim nemirima ako se nađe uvučen u sukob.
Geopolitički kontekst dodatno komplicira situaciju. UAE i Bahrain, koji su normalizirali odnose s Izraelom putem Abrahamovih sporazuma, mogli bi biti mete iranske retorike ili napada, posebice ako se tenzije između Irana i Izraela pogoršaju. Katar, koji održava diplomatske veze s Iranom, mogao bi pokušati posredovati, ali njegova uloga bila bi ograničena zbog savezništva s SAD-om. Ove zemlje, članice Vijeća za suradnju u Zaljevu (GCC), vjerojatno bi koordinirale svoje sigurnosne strategije, ali unutarnje razlike – poput povremenih napetosti između Katara i UAE-a – mogle bi otežati zajednički odgovor.
Mogući odgovori na krizu
Odgovor na zatvaranje Hormuškog tjesnaca uključivao bi kombinaciju vojnih, diplomatskih i ekonomskih mjera, s naglaskom na brzo uspostavljanje sigurnosti i stabilnosti.
1. Vojni odgovor
SAD bi vjerojatno preuzele vodeću ulogu u osiguravanju tjesnaca. Peta flota, sa sjedištem u Bahrainu, ima kapacitete za čišćenje mina, pratnju tankera i neutralizaciju iranskih prijetnji. Povijesne operacije, poput Earnest Will tijekom 1980-ih, pokazuju da SAD mogu učinkovito zaštititi pomorski promet, iako uz rizik od eskalacije. Saveznici poput Velike Britanije i Francuske, koji su dio međunarodnih pomorskih koalicija, mogli bi pružiti dodatnu podršku.
Regionalne zemlje, poput Saudijske Arabije i UAE-a, mogle bi doprinijeti logistikom i zračnim snagama, ali njihov izravan angažman bio bi ograničen zbog straha od iranske odmazde. Vojna eskalacija, međutim, nosi rizik od šireg sukoba, uključujući napade na naftnu infrastrukturu u regiji, što bi dodatno pogoršalo krizu.
2. Diplomatski odgovor
Diplomatski napori usmjereni bi bili na deeskalaciju i pritisak na Iran da otvori tjesnac. EU, koja ima Sporazum o suradnji s GCC-om, mogla bi posredovati, kao što je to činila u prošlim pregovorima o iranskom nuklearnom programu. Katar, zahvaljujući svojim vezama s Iranom i Zapadom, mogao bi igrati ulogu posrednika, dok bi zemlje poput Indije i Japana, ovisne o nafti iz Zaljeva, vršile ekonomski pritisak na Iran.
Unutar Irana, konačna odluka o zatvaranju tjesnaca leži u rukama Vrhovnog vijeća za nacionalnu sigurnost, a ne samo parlamenta, koji je nedavno podržao prijedlog za blokadu. To sugerira da Iran možda koristi prijetnju kao sredstvo za pregovore, tražeći ustupke poput ukidanja sankcija ili smanjenja američkog vojnog prisustva u regiji.
3. Ekonomski odgovor
U kratkom roku, zemlje Zaljeva pokušale bi preusmjeriti izvoz putem alternativnih ruta, poput cjevovoda East-West u Saudijskoj Arabiji ili luke Fujairah u UAE-u. Međutim, ovi kapaciteti su ograničeni i ranjivi na napade, primjerice od strane Huta u Jemenu, koji su povezani s Iranom. Globalne zemlje uvoznice nafte mogle bi se okrenuti drugim izvorima, poput Rusije ili Latinske Amerike, ali to bi zahtijevalo vrijeme i povećalo troškove.
Dugoročno, kriza bi mogla potaknuti investicije u diversifikaciju ekonomija ovih zemalja. UAE i Katar već ulažu u turizam, tehnologiju i financije, dok Irak i Kuvajt zaostaju u ovom procesu. Zatvaranje tjesnaca naglasilo bi hitnost smanjenja ovisnosti o nafti i plinu.
Zaključak
Zatvaranje Hormuškog tjesnaca od strane Irana predstavljalo bi egzistencijalnu prijetnju za Bahrain, Irak, Kuvajt, Katar i UAE, izazivajući ekonomske šokove, sigurnosne rizike i političke tenzije. Prekid izvoza nafte i plina ugrozio bi prihode ovih zemalja, dok bi prijetnja iranskim vojnim akcijama povećala regionalnu nestabilnost. Međutim, potpuna i dugotrajna blokada bila bi malo vjerojatna zbog štete koju bi nanijela samom Iranu i snažnog vojnog prisustva SAD-a u regiji.
Odgovor na krizu uključivao bi brzu vojnu intervenciju za osiguranje tjesnaca, diplomatske napore za deeskalaciju i ekonomske mjere za ublažavanje posljedica.
Ključnu ulogu imale bi zemlje GCC-a, u suradnji s međunarodnim partnerima poput SAD-a i EU-a. Ipak, situacija ostaje nestabilna, a dugoročna stabilnost zahtijeva šire rješavanje geopolitičkih napetosti u regiji, uključujući iranski nuklearni program i regionalne rivalitete. Hormuški tjesnac ostaje simbol globalne povezanosti i ranjivosti, gdje potezi jedne zemlje mogu izazvati dalekosežne posljedice za cijeli svijet.
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