A new source of energy: methane hydrate

It reached +30°C (86.5°F) in the Arctic today. Hotter than pretty much all of Europe right now. Truly exceptional for any time of the year but mind-boggling for May. Velsky District (Russian: Ве́льский райо́н) now 33°C. The reason, a new source of energy: methane hydrate, a crystalline form of natural gas found in Arctic permafrost. At room temperature the crystal gives off intense heat, earning it the nickname of "fire in ice," and making the estimated 700,000 trillion cubic feet of the substance scattered around the world a potentially major fuel source, containing more energy than all previously discovered oil and gas combined.

Not only Russians do research. Last year, ConocoPhillips worked with the DOE on a test run-producing natural gas from methane hydrate in Alaska's North Slope, home to about 85 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable methane hydrate, according to DOE statistics. The company spent 13 days injecting carbon dioxide and nitrogen into methane-hydrate clusters in the permafrost. The chemical cocktail fractures the permafrost, allowing the gas to escape through the newly made fractures for collection.

No one even knew that hydrates existed in nature. Fossil fuel companies started injecting water, sand, and chemicals into shale rocks to split them apart and suck the natural gas out of the cracks. Soon they came to realize there is a ridiculous amount of the stuff. Unlike with fracking, no chemicals are involved with hydrate extraction: just methane and water. It's in the photo is a piece of methane hydrate found by U.S. scientists off the coast of Oregon. Of course, all of this is easier to do at normal temperatures, so we go back to the beginning of my post.

Na sjevernoj padini Aljaske ili u Sibiru lakše je frakirati na normalnim temperaturama, kao što je u Lici lakše saditi krumpire kad nema leda. Metan hidrati, pronađeni u permafrostu, imaju velik potencijal kao budući izvor energije. Konvencionalni proizvodni načini do sada su imali loše rezultate, ali onda su znanstvenici otkrili učinkovit način proizvodnje kombiniranjem hidrauličkog lomljenja iz vodoravnih bušotina i cirkulacije vruče vode kroz lomove. E sad, svima, ali baš svima u industriji odgovara da se Sibir, Aljaska, pa i cijeli Arktik zagrije bar za 10 °C da je ekipi lakše raditi i da troše manje love na opremu za frakiranje. Pojednostavljeno, princip je da se sve toplija i toplija voda pušta kroz pukotine da bi se došlo do metan hidrata. Počinje se s upumpavanjem vode u sediment od 10°C, pa se kroz nekoliko mjeseci diže do 50°C, da bi na kraju, ako se želi što bolji rezultat i što više metan hidrata izvući, voda zagrijava do točke vrenja. Za razliku od Antarktika, na Artiku ne važe nikakva posebna pravila pa je sada gore Wild Wild North, svatko radi što ga volja. Dok se mi sjetimo i shvatimo što se događa, po Artiku će već tratinčice rasti. Malo ćemo pričekati, ali nakon toga na red dolazi Antartika. Zeljko Serdar

Vitamin D deficiency in India

With this review, we aim to summarize the existing literature on Vitamin D status in India and understand the enormity of the problem. The prevalence of Vitamin D deficiency ranged from 40% to 99%, with most of the studies reporting a prevalence of 80%–90%. 

Urban India is shunning the sunlight and in the process, grappling with an epidemic — a deficiency of Vitamin D. With or without symptoms, doctors are diagnosing almost every urban Indian with the deficiency of a vitamin that is manufactured in the body when the skin is exposed to sunlight. Vitamin D helps in the absorption of calcium and its deficiency can lead to bone diseases such as osteoporosis along with other muscle and nerve-related diseases. It also increases the chances of developing diabetes. Vitamin D deficiency prevails in epidemic proportions all over the Indian subcontinent, with a prevalence of 70%–100% in the general population. In India, widely consumed food items such as dairy products are rarely fortified with vitamin D. Indian socio-religious and cultural practices do not facilitate adequate sun exposure, thereby negating the potential benefits of plentiful sunshine. Consequently, subclinical vitamin D deficiency is highly prevalent in both urban and rural settings, and across all socioeconomic and geographic strata. Vitamin D deficiency is likely to play an important role in the very high prevalence of rickets, osteoporosis, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, cancer, and infections such as tuberculosis in India. Fortification of staple foods with vitamin D is the most viable population-based strategy to achieve vitamin D sufficiency. Unfortunately, even in advanced countries like the USA and Canada, food fortification strategies with vitamin D have been only partially effective and have largely failed to attain vitamin D sufficiency. This article reviews the status of vitamin D nutrition in the Indian subcontinent and also the underlying causes for this epidemic. Implementation of population-based educational and interventional strategies to combat this scourge requires recognition of vitamin D deficiency as a public health problem by the governing bodies so that healthcare funds can be allocated appropriately.

A 2019 pan-India study found that 70-90 percent of Indians are deficient in the sunshine vitamin, and the deficiency can have adverse consequences for skeletal development in babies and children, and bone health in adults. The study was authored by diabetologist PG Talwalkar, and Vaishali Deshmukh, MC Deepak, and Dinesh Agrawal. It noted that the deficiency is linked to chronic diseases, including diabetes, hypertension, and cardiovascular disease. The study found that 84.2 percent of Type II diabetes patients were Vitamin D deficient, 82.6 percent of hypertension patients. It noted that there is no significant variation in deficiency levels across North, South, East, or West regions, with each reporting deficiency prevalence of 88 percent, 90 percent, 93 percent, and 91 percent respectively.

Dr. Sushila Kataria, Senior Director of Internal Medicine at Medanta The Medicity, Gurugram, agrees that vitamin D deficiency has been a long-prevalent issue in India anyway and that we should be vigilant about these levels throughout the year, lockdown or not. Dr. Kataria explains that in certain amounts of UV light, cholesterol in the blood gets converted into vitamin D, adding, “It acts like a hormone, helping in calcium homeostasis and, in turn, bone and muscle strength, as well as optimizing the nervous system.” There are two sub-sects of vitamin D: D2 (found in plants) and D3 (found in fatty animal sources). But Dr. Kataria says that it is difficult to find abundant sources of both in India, hence the need for fortified foods.

Mumbai-based Tanvi Dalal, the founder of WellNest Nutrition, recommends her clients to take multivitamin supplements, adding, “Many people, without testing their levels, assume they are eating a lot of vitamin D-rich foods, such as one piece of salmon for dinner or a whole bowl of cereal which is fortified with vitamin D. These portions are not enough; matching up to 800 IU is very tough. A can of tuna can claim to have 500 IU, but you will not eat the whole can, only two tablespoons most likely. For people, up to 70 years of age, between 600 to 800 IU of vitamin D is required, and the multivitamin covers this exactly, without going over or under.” Tanvi says it’s best to spend between 30 minutes and an hour on the balcony or terrace, between 11 am and 2 pm when the sun is at its nexus. The big key here is to not wear any SPF. Sunscreen-lovers may balk at such a suggestion, but Tanvi affirms that SPF will filter out your sunlight exposure and stop vitamin D production. If you are prone to sunburn, opt for shorter bursts through this period.

Both vitamin D and B12 deficiencies are related to depression and anxiety, especially at this time. Medically, before prescribing an anti-anxiety tablet, your doctor may check these levels, and prescribe a supplement along with psychotherapy. Spending at least half an hour in sunlight with exposure of face and arms is the minimum requirement to fight the deficiency apart from taking supplements that are mostly harmless. Infants should get exposed to the sun, at least 10 to 15 mins a day, which generates 10 to 20,000 Vitamin D units. Along with that, experts also suggest Vitamin D supplements until the age of 1 year depending on the condition to combat the deficiency. Zeljko Serdar, CCRES

Most people didn't pay attention - Gold Standard.

Most people didn't pay attention. And, they still don't know what happened. There was no funeral or parade, but there should have been. When Richard Nixon directed the Secretary of the Treasury to “close the gold window,” he severed the only link between the USD & gold. And just like all "temporary" actions the US Government takes, what Nixon did has become a devastatingly permanent change. When the world got off the gold standard - it changed the entire world economy. 

The international monetary system after World War II was dubbed the Bretton Woods system after the meeting of forty-four countries in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in 1944. The countries agreed to keep their currencies fixed (but adjustable in exceptional situations) to the dollar, and the dollar was fixed to gold. Since 1958, when the Bretton Woods system became operational, countries settled their international balances in dollars, and US dollars were convertible to gold at a fixed exchange rate of $35 an ounce. The United States had the responsibility of keeping the dollar price of gold fixed and had to adjust the supply of dollars to maintain confidence in future gold convertibility.

Initially, the Bretton Woods system operated as planned. Japan and Europe were still rebuilding their postwar economies and demand for US goods and services—and dollars—was high. Since the United States held about three-quarters of the world’s official gold reserves, the system seemed secure.

In the 1960s, European and Japanese exports became more competitive with US exports. The US share of world output decreased and so did the need for dollars, making converting those dollars to gold more desirable. The deteriorating US balance of payments, combined with military spending and foreign aid, resulted in a large supply of dollars around the world. Meanwhile, the gold supply had increased only marginally. Eventually, there were more foreign-held dollars than the United States had gold. The country was vulnerable to a run on gold and there was a loss of confidence in the US government’s ability to meet its obligations, thereby threatening both the dollar’s position as a reserve currency and the overall Bretton Woods system.

Many efforts were made to adjust the US balance of payments and to uphold the Bretton Woods system, both domestically and internationally. These were meant to be “quick fixes” until the balance of payments could readjust, but they proved to be postponing the inevitable.

In March 1961, the US Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF), with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York acting as its agent, began to intervene in the foreign-exchange market for the first time since World War II. The ESF buys and sells foreign exchange currency to stabilize conditions in the exchange rate market. While the interventions were successful for a time, the Treasury’s lack of resources limited its ability to mount broad dollar defense.

From 1962 until the closing of the US gold window in August 1971, the Federal Reserve relied on “currency swaps” as its key mechanism for temporarily defending the US gold stock. The Federal Reserve structured the reciprocal currency arrangements, or swap lines, by providing foreign central banks cover for unwanted dollar reserves, limiting the conversion of dollars to gold.

In March 1962, the Federal Reserve established its first swap line with the Bank of France and by the end of that year, lines had been set up with nine central banks (Austria, Belgium, England, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Canada). Altogether, the lines provided up to $900 million equivalent in foreign exchange. What started as a small, short-term credit facility grew to be a large, intermediate-term facility until the US gold window closed in August 1971. The growth and need for the swap lines signaled that they were not just a temporary fix, but a sign of a fundamental problem in the monetary system.

International efforts were also made to stem a run on gold. A run in the London gold market sent the price to $40 an ounce on October 20, 1960, exacerbating the threat to the system. In response, the London Gold Pool was formed on November 1, 1961. The pool consisted of a group of eight central banks (Great Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France, and the United States). In order to keep the price of gold at $35 an ounce, the group agreed to pool gold reserves to intervene in the London gold market in order to maintain the Bretton Woods system. The pool was successful for six years until another gold crisis ensued. The British pound sterling devalued and another run on gold occurred, and France withdrew from the pool. The pool collapsed in March 1968.

At that time the seven remaining members of the London Gold Pool (Great Britain, West Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and the United States) agreed to formulate a two-tiered system. The central banks agreed to use their gold only in settling international debts and to not sell monetary gold on the private market. The two-tier system was in place until the US gold window closed in 1971.

These efforts of the global financial community proved to be temporary fixes to a broader structural problem with the Bretton Woods system. The structural problem, which has been called the “Triffin dilemma,” occurs when a country issues a global reserve currency (in this case, the United States) because of its global importance as a medium of exchange. The stability of that currency, however, comes into question when the country is persistently running current account deficits to fulfill that supply. As the current account deficits accumulate, the reserve currency becomes less desirable and its position as a reserve currency is threatened.

While the United States was in the midst of the Triffin dilemma, it was also facing a growing problem of inflation at home. The period that became known as the Great Inflation had started and policymakers had put anti-inflation policies in place, but they were short-lived and ineffective. At first, both the Nixon administration and the Federal Reserve believed in a gradual approach, slowly lowering inflation with a minimum increase in unemployment. They would tolerate an unemployment rate of up to 4.5 percent, but by the end of the 1969-70 recession the unemployment rate had climbed to 6 percent, and inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, was 5.4 percent.

When Arthur Burns became chairman of the Board of Governors in 1970, he was faced with both slow growth and inflation or stagflation. Burns believed that tightening monetary policy and the increase in unemployment that accompanied it would be ineffective against the inflation then occurring, because it stemmed from forces beyond the control of the Fed, such as labor unions, food and energy shortages, and OPEC’s control of oil prices. Moreover, many economists in the administration and at the Fed, including Burns, shared the view that inflation could not be reduced with an acceptable unemployment rate. According to economist Allan Meltzer, Andrew Brimmer, a Fed Board member from 1966 to 1974, noted at that time that employment was the principal goal and fighting inflation was the second priority. The Federal Open Market Committee implemented an expansionary monetary policy.

President Richard Nixon’s actions in 1971 to end dollar convertibility to gold and implement wage/price controls were intended to address the international dilemma of a looming gold run and the domestic problem of inflation. The new economic policy marked the beginning of the end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system and temporarily halted inflation.

With inflation on the rise and a gold run looming, Nixon’s administration coordinated a plan for bold action. From August 13 to 15, 1971, Nixon and fifteen advisers, including Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns, Treasury Secretary John Connally, and Undersecretary for International Monetary Affairs Paul Volcker (later Federal Reserve Chairman) met at the presidential retreat at Camp David and created a new economic plan. On the evening of August 15, 1971, Nixon addressed Offsite link the nation on a new economic policy that not only was intended to correct the balance of payments but also stave off inflation and lower the unemployment rate.

The first order was for the gold window to be closed. Foreign governments could no longer exchange their dollars for gold; in effect, the international monetary system turned into a fiat one. A few months later the Smithsonian agreement attempted to maintain pegged exchange rates, but the Bretton Woods system ended soon thereafter. The second order was for a 90-day freeze on wages and prices to check inflation. This marked the first time the government enacted wage and price controls outside of wartime. It was an attempt to bring down inflation without increasing the unemployment rate or slowing the economy. In addition, an import surcharge was set at 10 percent to ensure that American products would not be at a disadvantage because of exchange rates.

Shortly after the plan was implemented, the growth of employment and production in the United States increased. Inflation was practically halted during the 90-day wage-price freeze but would soon reappear as the monetary momentum in support of inflation had already begun. Nixon’s new economic policy represented a coordinated attack on the simultaneous problems of unemployment, inflation, and disequilibrium in the balance of payments. The plan was one of the many prescriptions written to cure inflation, which would eventually continue to rise.

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