In an age when global security and technological supremacy increasingly intertwine, sovereignty over communication systems is no longer a mere technical curiosity but a fundamental political and strategic issue. Dependence on foreign networks, especially those controlled by a single private company or a single state, is no longer seen as a temporary necessity but as a vulnerability that must be eliminated systematically. In this context, Europe, and particularly its northern members, is beginning to build its own alternatives that would enable states to exercise complete control over satellite links.
The essence is simple, yet the consequences are far-reaching. When a single private constellation of satellites becomes de facto critical infrastructure for the military, civil protection, rescue services and state administration, decisions about switching a service on or off cease to be purely commercial. They become political. Experiences from conflicts in which it became clear that communication channels can be restricted or denied at the owner’s discretion have left a deep mark. States have realised that sovereignty cannot rest on someone else’s goodwill, however advanced and reliable that technology may be.
Breaking Free from the American Kill Switch.
The response comes in the form of partnerships that bring together European industry and state needs. Finnish companies, renowned for their expertise in telecommunications and satellite technology, are developing low-Earth-orbit systems intended exclusively for governmental users. The key difference from existing commercial networks lies in ownership and control. The satellites, ground stations and terminals remain in the hands of the state that procures them. There is no external operator who can decide on the availability of the service. There is no political pressure that could extinguish the link at a critical moment. The system is conceived to be resilient, sovereign and entirely under national supervision.
Such an approach is not isolated. It fits into the broader European effort to reduce dependence on external technological giants. While own constellations are being built, Europe is simultaneously attracting experts, investing in research and development, and seeking ways for its own industries to occupy the place hitherto largely held by American or other external actors. This is a long-term strategy of technological autonomy that extends from satellite communications to a wider spectrum of critical technologies.
For smaller states, especially those located in the immediate vicinity of unstable regions, this question acquires additional weight. The ability to rely exclusively on one’s own infrastructure under crisis conditions is not a luxury, but a necessity. Satellite networks that a state itself owns and operates enable uninterrupted communication between military units, civil services and central institutions, regardless of what is happening on the ground or in diplomatic circles.
Nokia, ICEYE and the New European Space Doctrine.
Of course, the road to full sovereignty is neither swift nor inexpensive. Launching satellites, building ground infrastructure, developing terminals resistant to jamming and ensuring continuous maintenance require substantial investment and long-term political will. Yet the price of dependence can be still higher. When a communication system can be switched off with a single stroke, the cost is measured not only in money, but in human lives, territorial losses and the loss of strategic autonomy.
In this light, the efforts to build a European alternative are not merely a technological undertaking. They are the expression of a deeper realisation that in the twenty-first century sovereignty no longer rests solely on military force or economic strength, but also on the capacity to secure the flow of information by one’s own means. States that grasp this in time are building a future in which their critical links do not depend on the discretion of others. Those that fail to grasp it remain vulnerable, however strong they may appear in other domains.
Thus a new balance is taking shape before our eyes. It is not a matter of rejecting cooperation or embracing isolationism, but of a wise separation of interests. Cooperation remains desirable, yet critical functions must remain under national or at least European control. Herein lie both the strength and the wisdom of this approach: not hostility towards others, but responsibility towards oneself.
U doba kada se globalna sigurnost i tehnološka nadmoć sve više isprepliću, pitanje suverenosti komunikacijskih sustava prestaje biti tehnička zanimljivost i postaje temeljno političko i strateško pitanje. Ovisnost o tuđim mrežama, osobito onima koje kontrolira jedna privatna tvrtka ili jedna država, više se ne doživljava kao privremena nužnost, nego kao ranjivost koja se mora sustavno uklanjati. U tom kontekstu Europa, a posebno njezini sjeverni članovi, počinju graditi vlastite alternative koje bi državama omogućile potpunu kontrolu nad satelitskim vezama.
Suština je jednostavna, a posljedice dalekosežne. Kada jedna privatna konstelacija satelita postane de facto kritična infrastruktura za vojsku, civilnu zaštitu, spašavanje i državnu upravu, tada odluke o uključivanju ili isključivanju usluge prestaju biti čisto poslovne. One postaju političke. Iskustva iz sukoba u kojima se pokazalo da se komunikacijski kanali mogu ograničiti ili uskratiti prema nahođenju vlasnika sustava ostavila su dubok trag. Države su shvatile da suverenost ne može počivati na tuđoj dobroj volji, ma kako napredna i pouzdana ta tehnologija bila.
When Connectivity Becomes Power – Finland’s Quiet Rebellion.
Odgovor dolazi u obliku partnerstava koja spajaju europsku industriju i državne potrebe. Finske tvrtke, poznate po stručnosti u telekomunikacijama i satelitskoj tehnologiji, razvijaju sustave niske Zemljine orbite namijenjene isključivo državnim korisnicima. Ključna razlika u odnosu na postojeće komercijalne mreže leži u vlasništvu i kontroli. Sateliti, zemaljske stanice i terminali ostaju u rukama države koja ih nabavlja. Nema vanjskog operatera koji može odlučiti o dostupnosti usluge. Nema političkog pritiska koji bi mogao ugasiti vezu u kritičnom trenutku. Sustav je zamišljen tako da bude otporan, suveren i potpuno pod nacionalnim nadzorom.
Takav pristup nije izoliran. On se uklapa u širi europski napor da se smanji ovisnost o vanjskim tehnološkim divovima. Dok se grade vlastite konstelacije, Europa istodobno privlači stručnjake, ulaže u istraživanje i razvoj te traži načine da vlastite industrije zauzmu mjesto koje su dosad uglavnom zauzimali američki ili drugi izvanjski akteri. Riječ je o dugoročnoj strategiji tehnološke autonomije, koja se proteže od satelitskih komunikacija do šireg spektra kritičnih tehnologija.
Za manje države, osobito one koje se nalaze u neposrednoj blizini nestabilnih regija, ovo pitanje dobiva dodatnu težinu. Mogućnost da se u kriznim uvjetima osloni isključivo na vlastitu infrastrukturu nije luksuz, nego nužnost. Satelitske mreže koje država sama posjeduje i upravlja njima omogućuju neprekinutu vezu između vojnih jedinica, civilnih službi i središnjih institucija, neovisno o tome što se događa na zemlji ili u diplomatskim krugovima.
Naravno, put do potpune suverenosti nije ni brz ni jeftin. Lansiranje satelita, izgradnja zemaljske infrastrukture, razvoj terminala otpornih na ometanja i osiguravanje kontinuiranog održavanja zahtijevaju značajna ulaganja i dugoročnu političku volju. No cijena ovisnosti može biti još viša. Kada se komunikacijski sustav može isključiti jednim potezom, cijena se mjeri ne samo novcem, nego i ljudskim životima, teritorijalnim gubicima i gubitkom strateške autonomije.
Control the Signal, Control the Future.
U tom svjetlu, napori da se izgradi europska alternativa nisu samo tehnološki pothvat. Oni su izraz dublje spoznaje da u XXI. stoljeću suverenost više ne počiva samo na vojnoj sili ili gospodarskoj snazi, nego i na sposobnosti da se vlastitim sredstvima osigura protok informacija. Države koje to shvate na vrijeme grade budućnost u kojoj njihove kritične veze ne ovise o nahođenju drugih. One koje to ne shvate ostaju ranjive, ma koliko se u drugim područjima činile snažnima.
Tako se pred našim očima oblikuje nova ravnoteža. Ne radi se o odbacivanju suradnje ili izolacionizmu, nego o mudrom razdvajanju interesa. Suradnja ostaje poželjna, ali kritične funkcije moraju ostati pod nacionalnom ili barem europskom kontrolom. U tome je i snaga i mudrost ovog pristupa,ne neprijateljstvo prema drugima, nego odgovornost prema sebi.
The European Commission, ESA and the SpaceRISE consortium have completed a key review of Europe’s IRIS2 secure communications constellation, clearing the programme to move forward with full-scale implementation.
ReplyDeleteThe completion of the review was announced on 7 August following negotiations that began in January. The review was used to validate the programme’s costs, technical requirements and delivery timelines. According to the European Commission, the agreement establishes a roadmap for development, production, and deployment, with the first satellites expected to launch in 2029.
When the initial concession contract was signed in December 2024, IRIS2 was expected to comprise 290 satellites, cost €10.55 billion, and offer initial capacity in 2030. According to a 7 August Hispasat release, the total planned investment now exceeds €15.6 billion. A total of €11.6 billion will come from public funding provided by the European Commission and the European Space Agency. The three SpaceRISE consortium partners, Hispasat, SES, and Eutelsat, will collectively invest up to €4 billion.
In addition to changes to the budget, the size of the constellation has also changed. A European Commission release explained that the revised constellation would comprise 348 satellites, including 330 in low Earth orbit and 18 in medium Earth orbit. This figure was contradicted by the Hispasat release, which put the total at 342 satellites, with the difference attributable to six fewer MEO satellites. While the 7 August SES release does not provide a total constellation size, it confirms that the MEO segment will comprise 18 satellites, which is consistent with the Commission’s breakdown. Additionally, a 7 August Eutelsat release stated that the LEO component would include 264 dual Mil-Ka/Ku-band satellites and 66 Mil-Ka-band satellites, for a total of 330, again consistent with the Commission’s breakdown.
All three primes have detailed their contributions to the €4 billion commitment from the project’s industrial partners. The SES release stated that it had committed up to €1.35 billion to the MEO segment. Hispasat announced an investment of up to €600 million in exchange for exploitation rights in regions of strategic and commercial interest. Finally, Eutelsat stated that it would contribute €2.23 billion. While Eutelsat’s figure may have changed in the intervening months, the disclosed commitments together total approximately €4.18 billion, a hair over the €4 billion approximation.
In a 7 August statement, the European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, explained that the bloc would be “accelerating the delivery of early defence and secure services” and that the network would be brought into operation “ahead of schedule.” Kubilius had previously said in January that he was confident initial IRIS2 services could be deployed by 2029, a year earlier than previously planned. The following month, he committed to delivering a “first simplified version” of IRIS2 by 2029. The 7 August announcement now confirms that “operational connectivity services” will be progressively deployed from 2029 onwards.
Though the claim tracks with Kubilius’s earlier statements, it is difficult to place much weight on an acceleration that could amount to little more than a handful of months when the programme’s budget has grown by roughly 50% since the €10.55 billion concession contract was signed in 2024.